

THE THIRD WAY NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT



SECURITY FIRST
A Strategy for Defending America

A Third Way Report

by

William Galston and Elaine Kamarck

With Sharon Burke

MAY 2007

Table of Contents

I. Introduction	1
II. America in the World Today: From Jubilation in Berlin to Chaos in Baghdad	3
III. Understanding the 21 st Century World	9
IV. Forging a "Security First" Strategy	13
V. Conclusion	47

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Michael O’Hanlon, who read a late draft of this essay and offered numerous comments and suggestions. His role as a friendly critic does not mean that he necessarily agrees with any particular proposal we offer, or with the overall thrust of our argument.

We must also acknowledge the numerous thinkers whose ideas we have appropriated, in each case with attribution. While some of our proposals are new, many are not. Our aim was to weave together the novel and the established to tell a compelling story about where our country has been, is now, and must go in the coming decades—and also to offer a cornucopia of practical ideas for rebuilding our credibility, strength and effectiveness in the world.

As this essay was on the verge of going to press, we learned that a distinguished scholar, Amitai Etzioni, would soon be publishing a study of US national security, also entitled *Security First*. Clearly there is something in the air, and we are grateful to Dr. Etzioni for taking the position that this thematic convergence raises no proprietary issues. We look forward to a public dialogue about the content of a new “security first” defense strategy.

I. Introduction

For more than four decades, the purpose of American foreign policy was to win the Cold War. On November 9, 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, that understanding of America's place in the world changed forever. Less than one month later, the Presidents of the Soviet Union and United States met at Malta and agreed that the Cold War was over.

A hopeful decade followed for America, full of optimism about the rise of freedom, prosperity and democracy around the world. There was reason to be optimistic: the global economy grew by \$11 trillion,¹ and the number of democracies in the world jumped by 74 percent.² On September 11, 2001, however, a group of 19 men armed with little more than box cutters destroyed that hope and replaced it with a sense of vulnerability.

President George W. Bush responded to America's new reality with determination, articulating a vision of American purpose based on the belief that advancing the cause of freedom and democracy in the world—even by force—was the best way of making America safe. The President believed that his 2004 re-election had validated that vision, which he expanded greatly in his second Inaugural Address.

But today, four years into the occupation of Iraq, Americans overwhelmingly reject the Bush Doctrine, and with good reason. The Administration has given us a foreign policy based on a series of illusions—about human nature, about US capacities and about the 21st century world. The result has been a severe setback for the United States that will take many years to reverse. The Administration's failures have left Americans unsure and uneasy about our place in the world.

As the Bush era stumbles to its end, we are no safer than we were six years ago—and the American people know it.³ It is time to answer the public's concerns with clarity. It is time to turn from utopian dreams to workable plans, from illusion to reality. It is time to put security first.

Putting security first means developing a long-term strategy for protecting the American people and our interests, supported by both political parties and sustained by allies around the world. It means restoring focus to America's foreign policy, by identifying the most urgent threats and most important responsibilities we face and ordering our approach to the world accordingly. It means creating new institutions that will allow us to confront our new enemies as successfully as we confronted the old. It means articulating a coherent view of our place in the world, firmly anchored in reality. And it means restoring Americans' confidence that we are respected for our principles, not just our power.

As we head into one of the most momentous elections in recent US history, the capacity of the presidential candidates to serve as Commander in Chief will be central, as it has been in most elections since the end of World War II. Candidates will have to do more than offer a laundry list of policy options. They will be judged by their ability to define the times in which we live and to offer a compelling vision for our future course in the world.

In this paper, we trace the path that the Bush Administration took to arrive at our current predicament. We define the nature of the threats we face. We argue that our next leaders must fundamentally alter the Bush Doctrine, based on an understanding of the concentric layers of threats and responsibilities

facing America in this new century. This reordering of security priorities points, in turn, to organizational changes needed to reform our governing institutions to meet the challenges we face now and in the decades to come. If these conceptual and structural changes were undertaken by our next president, they would inaugurate a new strategy of “security first” for our country.

“The American people have largely lost faith and confidence in the current course of the nation, including on national security issues, but they have yet to embrace an alternative.”

*Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O'Hanlon,
Hard Power: The New Politics of National
Security*

II. America in the World Today: From Jubilation in Berlin to Chaos in Baghdad

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire, the United States emerged as the world's only superpower. American ideas—representative institutions, open markets and free societies—seemed to sweep the field.

Today, however, our adversaries taunt us, our closest allies doubt our prudence and reliability and peoples undecided about their future are less sure that our ideas are right for their societies. This is not an inevitable evolution of the global system; it is a man-made disaster, resulting from the Bush Administration's poor choices in responding to September 11th. This section charts the journey from the optimism of the post-Soviet era, through the darkness of 9/11, to our current discredited, confused and insecure state.

A Brief Pax Americana: The Road to 9/11

After the end of the Cold War, it was reasonable to be optimistic about the future. There were expectations that the world's attention would shift from a tense standoff over nuclear weapons to a polite consensus about globalization, from armed conflict to peaceful competition. It seemed that economic growth would promote social liberalization, and then a peaceful transition to democracy, in formerly authoritarian regimes from Latin America to Central Asia. The United States advanced a national security strategy that framed military power in terms of preventing regional battles and humanitarian disasters. Haiti and Kosovo initially seemed to prove the wisdom of that approach. During this relatively halcyon period, terrorism was thought to represent a dangerous and perhaps growing problem, but not a threat to the American way of life.

To be sure, there were warning signs that history had not ended and that there was nothing inevitable about democracy and modernization. People around the world who felt left out of economic globalization mounted an increasingly angry protest against international agreements and institutions. Cultural globalization, which exposed the world to Western values and gender codes, rankled traditionalists everywhere. The end of the Cold War unfroze democratic hopes, but also ethnic and religious hatred, leading to genocidal conflict in Africa and the Balkans. The democratic tide bypassed a crucial region altogether—the Middle East—and did not seem to be lifting all boats in Latin America.

There were some troubling signs. Long-term gains in Kosovo and especially Haiti proved somewhat elusive, and Somalia was a humiliating defeat for American forces.

Attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, on American embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000, pointed to the rise of increasingly lethal anti-American terrorist groups.

September 11th: The End of the Post-Cold War Era

Until the September 11th attacks, most Americans saw these negative developments as distant clouds on the horizon of a bright future. In the wake of 9/11, however, we realized that the post-Cold War skies were far from clear. The reality was that there were people around the world who did not accept American ideals and preeminence, and some of them were willing to use any means to oppose us.

9/11 revealed another reality: the military strengths that served us so well in our struggle against the Soviet Union were less well suited to the new environment. Put simply, we were not as safe as we thought we were. The concept of “asymmetric warfare,” in which the weak make war against the strong, was a familiar one in countries that had long struggled against terrorism and insurgency, but it was unfamiliar to most Americans. That changed the day the Twin Towers fell. We began to understand an even more frightening reality: the terrorists would use any means they could get to attack us, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, these materials were available (particularly in the old Soviet states), terrorist groups were actively seeking them and we had very few defenses for preventing such an attack. A terrorist armed with a crude nuclear weapon could devastate a major urban area and trigger fundamental changes in our constitutional order.

This threat presents a danger to our way of life, regardless of how likely it is that such an attack would succeed, and in the wake of 9/11, the overwhelming majority of Americans agreed that President Bush was right to take the threat seriously. For a short moment, the world agreed as well, and peoples everywhere rallied against the terrorists’ callous destruction of innocent lives. There was broad and deep international support for the American military to fight back against al Qaeda and their Taliban enablers in Afghanistan. We had it in our power to lead a global alliance against terrorism and for peaceful democratization.

Iraq: A Disaster on Many Fronts

Instead of planning for a sustainable, international fight against terrorism, George Bush tried to change the game with a single military stroke, by ordering the invasion of Iraq. As we now know, members of the Bush Administration were determined from the beginning to go to war against that country. Even though there was no driving cause for an invasion—the Administration lacked compelling evidence that Saddam Hussein still possessed weapons of mass destruction or had any links with al Qaeda—the Bush Administration insisted that an attack on Iraq would bring about

democratic transformation throughout the Muslim Middle East and dramatically reduce the threat of terrorism. Disregarding professional military advice, the Administration treated the invasion as a showcase for high-tech military transformation. Worst of all, there was no plan to win the peace.

The result is a strategic disaster. As Iraq has descended into near-chaos, the historic split between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims has intensified, to the benefit of the neighboring radical Iranian regime and its allies throughout the region, helping to spark conflict in Lebanon. Moreover, there is a strong consensus in America's intelligence services that the conflict in Iraq is breeding terrorists much faster than we are killing or apprehending them. A new generation of extremists is honing its skills in Iraq.

The war is also a military disaster. Our soldiers and marines, some of whom are now entering their fourth tour of duty, are battered and overstretched. If another crisis requiring significant ground forces erupts elsewhere in the world, we would be hard-pressed to meet it. It is clear that former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's "Revolution in

“This fight depends on securing the population, which must understand that we—not our enemies—occupy the moral high ground.”

*General David H. Petraeus,
Open Letter to the Military, May 2007*

Military Affairs" cannot substitute for boots on the ground in the 21st century wars we are now fighting.

The war in Iraq has been a diplomatic disaster, as well. The Administration's new doctrine of preventive war—a break with international law and practice—has been thoroughly discredited, and America's standing in the eyes of the world has sunk to new lows.⁴ Our

historic allies doubt our judgment and our commitment to shared interests.⁵ Mainstream Muslims, whose support is essential if the terrorists are to be defeated, are being thrown on the defensive in their own societies, when it comes to views on the United States and democracy in general.⁶ The Administration's view that allies are a burden has made it difficult for us to make common cause with other nations.

And finally, the war in Iraq has been a political and moral disaster. It has divided and disheartened our people. It has led the Administration to play fast and loose with the Geneva Conventions and other international commitments, to expand executive power in ways that threaten our 200-year tradition of checks and balances, to disregard settled law and even to publicly justify techniques of interrogation that verge on torture. Many of the President's staunchest supporters now acknowledge that our struggle against terror cannot succeed unless other peoples see it as a legitimate battle, a test this Administration is not meeting.

While we hope that the military surge yields increased security and that political leaders in Baghdad can achieve national reconciliation, there is a very real possibility of an American failure in Iraq, with significant consequences. At the very least, the United States urgently needs a Plan B—a strategy for dealing with the possibility of large refugee flows, an increase in terrorism, the radicalization of neighboring populations, the rise of communal violence, massive economic dislocations, the threat of intervention by several of Iraq’s neighbors and the possibility of oil supply disruptions or price spikes.⁷ This strategy must include plans to provide safe haven for the many thousands of Iraqis who have risked their lives to cooperate with us. Leaving our Iraqi friends behind would compound military and political failure with moral failure. Yet despite all that is at stake, President Bush has publicly declared he has no contingency plan at all.

Collateral Damage from Iraq: America Exposed

In addition to the direct damage, the war in Iraq has had a negative impact on America in a number of other ways.

First, and most importantly, the war in Iraq has distracted us from other critical challenges. It has entangled American troops in a costly struggle that has made us less able to counter global threats and capture new opportunities. In many respects, al Qaeda is stronger today than it was in 2001, and its Taliban allies are fighting to retake Afghanistan. Iran and North Korea have accelerated their nuclear weapons programs. Given the former’s record of support for terrorism and the latter’s record of spreading weapons around the globe, their progress increases the odds that nuclear arms will fall into the hands of terrorists. China has expanded its military budget, its strategic profile and its relationships around the world, possibly at America’s expense and to an unclear end. Israel and the Palestinians are even farther from peace.

The war has also exposed this Administration’s lack of serious thinking and consistent purpose. As yesterday’s “autocrats” become today’s “moderates” in the coalition against Iran, the Bush team’s rhetorical shifts concerning democracy—in Egypt and elsewhere—have disheartened those fighting for a better future against steep odds. Encouraging and then turning our back on democratic activists sets back the cause of reform and is morally indefensible.⁸ Equally damaging is the pretense that supporting Pervez Musharraf promotes the cause of Pakistani democracy.⁹ This is the inevitable consequence of a grand theory that offers the illusion of putting democracy first, regardless of costs and circumstances. When the promotion of democracy clashes with America’s core security interests, we have historically come down on the side of security, and this Administration is no different, despite its elaborate claims.

The war has thereby exposed this Administration’s overblown rhetoric—in particular, President Bush’s second Inaugural Address. A democratic world certainly would be a more decent and peaceful world, and the United States should do all we

can to promote democracy peacefully. Most Americans agree with the President on that sentiment. Very few Americans agree, however, that invading nations to impose democracy is in America's interests. Indeed, achieving democratic advances will not always be within our power. There are political, economic, sociological, religious and cultural values and realities that come into play in every nation, and in some cases, those values and realities may simply not accommodate democratic governance here and now. There is ample reason to be optimistic that this will change over time. In 1776, after all, the Declaration of Independence astonished the world; today, there are 90 full-fledged democracies.¹⁰ But there is no reason to believe that America possesses the resources and skills to force other nations to become democratic against their wishes or on a faster timetable. Moreover, human beings do make choices, and not all human beings at all times will choose freedom and democracy above other concerns, no matter what we think they should do.

The war has underscored this Administration's misguided penchant for unilateral action. Its refusal to even consider or discuss the Kyoto Protocol and the contemptuous manner they showed in withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the International Criminal Court were early indicators of the "go it alone" attitude that was to prove so costly in Iraq. Ever since Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman moved the United States into a position of global leadership, presidents have understood that treaties, alliances and international institutions can amplify the effectiveness and legitimacy of American power. But President Bush's first term reflected an understanding of the United States as Gulliver prevented from acting by the Lilliputians. Given this view, breaking the threads that bound us emerged as a requirement of forceful policy, and the President acted accordingly. The damage to our standing will take many years to repair.

The war has exposed this Administration's misunderstanding of diplomacy. Negotiation is not a reward to other nations for good behavior; it is a tool for advancing our country's interests. For five long years, in some of the world's most dangerous places, the Bush team has sacrificed the reality of negotiated progress to the illusion of regime change. Until very recently, the Bush Administration opposed negotiations with nations such as North Korea, Syria and Iran on the grounds that this course was incompatible with eventual regime change. This is a misreading of history. From the beginning of the Cold War to its end, every US president conducted serious talks with the Soviet Union. Communism collapsed, not because we refused to negotiate, but rather because our economic performance, military technology and political ideals ultimately eroded the competitive standing and the will of our enemy. As Robert Litwak puts it, "The unresolved tension over the objective of US policy toward rogue states—behavior change versus regime change—frustrates the effective integration of force and diplomacy."¹¹

The war has also exposed the Administration's poor understanding of the terrorist threat. As evidence of the coming attack on the United States mounted in the summer of 2001, the Administration ignored urgent warnings and went about business as usual. After September 11th, the Administration argued that the absence of more attacks meant our enemies were defeated. Our enemies, however, are gathering strength, as subsequent attacks in Indonesia, Madrid, London, Morocco and Algeria illustrate.

Moreover, the Administration has insisted on looking at terror through the prism of 20th century, state-on-state military conflict. To be sure, military force is part of an effective response, but the United States must use all elements of national power, including police work, diplomacy and intelligence. The Administration has mocked political opponents for advocating the use of those tools and paid scant attention to improving our ability to use them effectively. This is a dangerous oversight: even before 9/11, a major terrorist attack involving civilian aircraft was thwarted by the quick thinking of a Philippine policewoman. In London, police action has prevented at least two attacks.

Above all, the war has exposed the Administration's detachment from reality. The years of happy talk about our "progress" in Iraq were no accident; they were evidence of the White House mindset. As early as the summer of 2002, a senior Administration official rejected what he termed the "reality-based community," which he defined as people who believe that solutions emerge from the "judicious study of discernible reality." He insisted: "That's not the way the world really works any more. We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality." He concluded on a note of unintended irony: "We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."¹²

Indeed we will. More than a half century ago, one of America's greatest thinkers warned that "a nation with an inordinate degree of political power is doubly tempted to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities, if it is informed by an idealism which does not understand the limits of man's wisdom and volition."¹³ This Administration clearly failed to understand the limits of our power, and this rejection of reality in favor of illusion has led us into catastrophe.

III. Understanding the 21st Century World

Modern Threats and Responsibilities

Iraq has become the symbol of the Bush Administration's failure, but the problem goes deeper. At a new moment in our history, the President and his advisors do not understand the nature and the scope of the challenges we face. 9/11 certainly required a military response, but it was not another Pearl Harbor. It was not the start of World War Three. And while the struggle with radical Islamist terrorism will be measured in generations, rather than months or years, 9/11 did not start a new Cold War, either. Our challenges today are different.

A distorted, radical form of one of the world's great religions, Islam, has become an urgent global challenge. Al Qaeda, its allies and affiliates are the most immediate threat, and nuclear-armed al Qaeda terrorists are the worst nightmare. But this threat takes other, distinctly different forms, as well, requiring distinctly different strategies to counter and eliminate the danger. A nuclear-armed or oil-rich state, such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, could fall into the hands of radical Islamists, for example. An extremist, theocratic regime fervently hostile to America and its allies, such as Iran, might enter the nuclear club and continue to sponsor terrorism around the region and possibly around the world.

This threat has not emerged, and does not flourish, in a vacuum. Since September 11th, we have begun to understand the impact of an intertwined knot of pathologies—radical ideologies, historical resentments and nationalist

sentiments, ethnic and religious divisions, corrupt governments that fail to deliver basic services to their peoples, an inability to meet the economic challenges of globalization and an outright rejection of modernization. Untangling this knot is the most complex challenge we face. But unless we do so, supporting a range of partners within the Islamic world, our struggle against radical, violent Islamism will fail.

Another significant conceptual failure of the Bush Administration has been its inability to come to grips with the complexity of the 21st century world. The 20th century's simple bipolarity, with its sharp definitions and easy symmetry—the Axis or the Allies, the East or the West—is history. Today, America is the sole remaining superpower, but it has become unclear what that really means. On 9/11 and in Iraq,

“...America will continue to be number one, but even so, in this global information age, number one ain't gonna be what it used to be.”

*Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
The Paradox of American Power*

our vulnerabilities—military, economic and institutional—have been laid bare. At the same time, rivals are rising. Our next leaders must find ways to protect this country and promote our interests in a changing strategic landscape—while repairing the damage done by the Bush years of arrogance and incompetence.

None of this will be easy. We will be able to use some of the traditional tools of statecraft—military power, diplomacy and propaganda, among others—but some of those tools will not work for today’s enemies. With terrorists and criminals beyond the control of other governments, classic methods of deterrence and containment are much less likely to succeed. To meet this challenge, we will need new tools and strategies.

We will also need new governance institutions. On September 10, 2001, Harry Truman would have seen the same Cold War security architecture he built—with the exception of the US military’s ability to fight as a single, “joint” fighting force. While it is perhaps understandable that there were no widespread government reforms between 1989 and 2001, it is astonishing that there have been so few since. Indeed, the Administration has not been interested in, and even has seemed hostile to, such a process.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt launched an investigation into how the United States could have suffered such a catastrophe. In contrast, the Bush Administration not only failed to do so, it dragged its heels when Congress demanded the creation of the 9/11 Commission. It impeded the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and failed to engage in significant reform of the intelligence community, eventually creating an entirely new bureaucracy in the Director of National Intelligence. The Administration then failed to make either institution effective; quite the reverse, as Hurricane Katrina made clear. More recently, the report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction tells a tale of bureaucratic layering and duplication, red tape, turf protection and repeated failures to cooperate that would almost be funny if the consequences were not so grim.¹⁴ The Bush Administration’s inattention and even hostility to governance reflects—and magnifies—its failed strategic vision and incompetent execution.

Modern Realities

While 9/11 and the war in Iraq have dimmed bright post-Cold War hopes, they should not produce pessimism and must not lead to an American withdrawal from the world. With a new strategy, we can get back on track and move toward a safer America and a better world.

As we offer a new direction for a new century, we reaffirm the principle that sustained this nation through the vicious world wars of the 20th century and the long twilight struggle against the Soviet Union: American power is a force for good in the world that no other nation can match. Perhaps the worst consequence for America of

the war in Iraq is that many nations, and even many Americans, no longer believe that this nation is a force for good.

Yet even today, at the nadir of our prestige, most other nations do understand that an American withdrawal from the world would weaken the structures of order on which all nations depend. We are used to complaining about the manifest imperfections of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, but the fact is that these institutions benefit our nation and all nations in ways that would have been inconceivable a century ago. The restoration of American leadership in the world is necessary, but it must not come at the expense of protecting our country. Indeed, these two goals should have never been in competition in the first place.

The next American president will have to protect and to lead, without putting those two objectives into conflict. That means understanding, and acting on, some emerging realities and enduring truths about the tasks ahead:

- We must put *security first* and focus on fighting the gravest threats and forestalling potential dangers—especially terrorists armed with nuclear weapons.
- We must *discard comforting illusions*. The United States should always be moving forward toward a goal of stability, liberty and prosperity for all, but we must take our bearings from the world as it is, not as we wish it might be someday.
- We must balance our *ends and means*; we must match our commitments with resources, with an ample reserve for the unexpected.
- We must *reinforce existing international alliances and institutions*—and when necessary create new ones—to strengthen our hand against our adversaries and create new opportunities with our friends.
- We must *exploit all our advantages*—economic, cultural and moral as well as military—in the struggle against our enemies and rivals and the pursuit of friends and allies.
- We must *use negotiations*—even with regimes whose principles and policies we rightly detest—to advance our national interest and to increase the legitimacy of steps we may be compelled to take if diplomacy fails.
- We must *rejoin the battles of ideas*—to convince our friends that our cause is necessary and just, and also to persuade the undecided to choose the path of moderation and tolerance.
- We must *do what we can to advance democracy*, because a democratic world would be a more decent and more peaceful world. But we cannot advance democracy everywhere, and we cannot expect to create it by force anywhere.¹⁵

IV. Forging a “Security First” Strategy

To meet these realities and develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy for the 21st century, the next administration will have to engage in both conceptual and organizational change. Conceptually, it must redefine and refocus the purpose of American foreign policy, away from the illusions of the Bush years and toward a clear-eyed assessment of how best to protect and promote America, her people and her interests. Organizationally, it must reform our government and alliance structures to build the capacities we need to provide security in the 21st century.

We offer below ten changes that the next president should consider, four conceptual and six organizational.

Conceptual Change: Redefining and Refocusing American Foreign Policy

To return American foreign policy to a focus on security, policymakers should adopt a strategy based on four concentric circles of concern. In the innermost circle is the most immediate threat to the United States: al Qaeda and its affiliates. The next circle is the gravest threat we face: nuclear proliferation. The third ring is the array of direct and indirect threats posed by our dependence on foreign sources of energy. And the last ring consists of threats to the global commons—everything from mass pandemics to global warming—which America must help to redress not only for reasons of altruism but also of significant self-interest.¹⁶

1. **Battling Terrorism Without Illusion.** We need a new strategy designed to take on and defeat al Qaeda’s signature strengths. Third Way’s strategy of “constriction”¹⁷ would put irresistible pressure on al Qaeda’s physical resources (money, weapons and safe havens), on their human resources (leadership and recruiting) and on their ideas and the means by which they spread them.
2. **Re-Engaging the World to Counter Nuclear Proliferation.** We need new policies to battle the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries unable or unwilling to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists. This means preventing, wherever possible, the creation of weapons-grade materials that could be used in the construction of a nuclear device. Where that is not possible, we should be devoting extensive resources to the tracking and securing of those materials, to protect against theft and illicit transfers.
3. **Providing Basic Energy Security.** We need to recognize—and act boldly on—the proposition that energy security is a vital element of 21st century national security. This means, above all, policies that significantly expand non-

fossil fuel sources of energy and thereby reduce the leverage hostile oil-producing nations now enjoy.

- 4. *Protecting the Global Commons.*** We need to take seriously our role in the world as protector of the global commons—both for the moral credibility of our leadership and as a matter of US national security. That means not only handling obvious threats to American interests—like a closing of shipping lanes—but also problems that can metastasize from localized to global. So America must move away from this Administration’s resistance to active participation in the fight to contain global warming. And we must accept the burden of leadership in the struggle for global decency, through intensified efforts to end AIDS and other diseases that kill millions of people, to reduce infant mortality, provide health care, universal literacy and basic services, to fight corruption and prevent genocide.

Organizational Change: Reforming Government to Meet 21st Century Requirements

Once policymakers turn their attention to focusing on the four concentric circles of security threats and responsibilities, they will find they lack many of the tools they need. Significant government reform will be necessary, and that will require the following:

- 5. *Creating a 21st Century Military.*** In the wake of Iraq, we need a military prepared to meet the challenges we face. We need to add 100,000 additional ground troops as well as enhanced special operations forces and advanced weaponry dictated by actual battlefield conditions and credible threat assessments. In the past five years, military transformation has been built around ideological assumptions and theories in search of evidence. That must change.
- 6. *Gathering 21st Century Intelligence.*** We need an intelligence community that is reformed from the bottom up, one that can track networks of terrorists as well as organized states that pose traditional threats to the United States. These reforms must include a new melding of intelligence, law enforcement and special operations forces to hunt down terrorists before they strike—the kind of systematic cooperation the enabled the British to thwart mass murder in the skies over the Atlantic.
- 7. *Overhauling Homeland Security.*** We need a new homeland security structure and strategy that fixes the defects of the Department of Homeland Security and focuses our resources on the most serious risks we face, where we face them. This means creating the robust border protection we need in the post-

9/11 era and increasing our capacity to respond to natural disasters as well as terror attacks.

- 8. *Taking on State-Building.*** Given the danger of failed states to our security, the US Government must be able to stabilize and reconstruct societies in turmoil, from Afghanistan to Darfur. The capacity of our government to carry out these missions, however, is weak, and that is largely a consequence of institutional problems at the Department of State. We will need a stronger State Department in order to succeed at state building.
- 9. *Promoting Democracy the Right Way.*** The American tradition of promoting democracy, by deed and example, dates back to the birth of the nation. The Bush years have seriously damaged this tradition. We need to restore it by rebuilding our institutions for peaceful democracy promotion and restoring the credibility they once had. In particular, we need a 21st century public diplomacy capacity.
- 10. *Building 21st Century Alliance Structures.*** The US must lead an effort to reform and modernize international institutions and alliances, and create wholly new organizations, where necessary. In order to do that, however, we will first have to restore the faith the world once had in American leadership.

1. Battling Terrorism Without Illusion

Five years after President Bush declared that America would act decisively to “rid the world of evil,” terrorism continues to pose an urgent threat to our national security. In fact, an overwhelming majority of national security experts believe that the United States is actually losing the war on terror. On the president’s watch, terrorist groups have become more diverse, dispersed, ideologically driven and more deadly. Our enemies are not defeated; they are gathering strength.

The evidence is clear:

- There are more al Qaeda members today than there were in 2001.
- The number of al Qaeda-related terrorist attacks worldwide has increased.
- Al Qaeda’s leadership remains at large and is able to communicate with its affiliates and the global public as well.
- Al Qaeda forces and their allies are making a comeback in Eastern and South Afghanistan and in Western Pakistan.
- Al Qaeda has gone from being a centralized organization to a broad-based movement, with allies and independently operating small cells all over the world.

Meanwhile, US forces, stretched to the breaking point, may be less able to confront al Qaeda, and global anti-American sentiment has risen dramatically, especially in the Islamic world.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates are America's central enemy and most urgent threat today. With its combination of high-tech and low-tech warfare and decentralized power structure, al Qaeda is a hydra-headed beast that, like its mythical counterpart, seems to grow in size and power as we fight it. It has the capacity to replace the leaders we capture or kill. In that respect, among others, it differs fundamentally from the enemies we faced in the 20th century. And it is the Administration's failure to come to grips with the difference between our 20th and 21st century enemies that, combined with incompetence and ideological rigidity, has compromised its efforts to defeat al Qaeda.

This failure has led to three major conceptual errors with operational consequences:

- *The Domino Theory of Counterterrorism.* Like the domino theory of the last century, in which states would fall one-by-one to communism, the Bush doctrine predicts that newly established democracies will pressure and ultimately topple dictatorships and theocracies, which will in turn create new democracies and eliminate terrorism. The first domino has failed to fall, however, and there are no others lined up. In fact, the effort to impose democracy by force in Iraq has led to a failed state in Iraq and a weakening democracy in Afghanistan. These countries are now among the prime incubators for the next generation of terrorists.
- *Fighting State-on-State Warfare instead of a Global Counterinsurgency.* President Bush has likened al Qaeda to the totalitarian threats of the 20th century. Although just as evil as communism and fascism, al Qaeda is not a state or even a monolithic power, has no mechanized fighting force and instead uses 21st century technology to wage asymmetric warfare. By relying on 20th century military means rather than the full range of America's strengths, the Bush Administration is actually helping al Qaeda attract new recruits faster than we can arrest or kill them.
- *Binary Logic.* With rhetoric that harkens back to the struggles of the 20th century, the President demanded that the world take sides: either you are with America and do it our way, or you are with the terrorists. This uncompromising position made it harder to enlist the help of partners and allies, especially in the Muslim world—assistance that is essential to halting and reversing the global growth of terrorism.

To win the fight against al Qaeda, we need an entirely new strategy that recognizes the novel threat this organization poses and deploys the full range of America's strengths against it. The United States must throw a global noose around

the al Qaeda movement and slowly pull it tight. We need a strategy of “constriction” to squeeze al Qaeda’s supply lines, from foot soldiers to high finance and systematically eliminate its ability to wage war. In executing this strategy, three targets are key:

First, we must put pressure on their *physical resources*—their supplies of money, access to weapons, ability to travel and use of safe havens and failed states.

Second, we must pressure the supply line of al Qaeda’s *ideas* by attacking their propaganda, which they spread by computer, audio and video tape, mobile phone and community gathering points such as sympathetic mosques and religious schools.

Third, we must put pressure on their supply line of *people*, not only by targeting their leadership, but also by comprehensive efforts to slow the flow of new recruits.

For this strategy to succeed, the United States must change its institutions and tactics in three ways.

- *Remodel Our Civilian and Military Forces.* Our diplomats and other civil servants, intelligence offices, first responders and uniformed military should be reshaped into an integrated force that can constrict al Qaeda’s supply lines.
- *Rebuild Strong Anti-Terror Alliances.* We should build on the unity of international purpose against terrorism to restore relations with our friends and partners—particularly in the Muslim world—and enlist them in the struggle to constrict al Qaeda’s supply lines of material resources, people and ideas.
- *Conduct Effective Public Diplomacy.* We should restructure and reinvest in our institutions of public diplomacy and use the power of our ideas to persuade others that the fight against al Qaeda is their own.

Of all these steps, none is more important than revitalizing our institutions and programs of public diplomacy. Not only is the current budget for public diplomacy laughably low, less than 10 percent (a paltry \$140 million) is devoted to the Near East and South Asia, where a majority of the world’s Muslims reside. Instead, we are lavishing resources on media, widely regarded as mouthpieces for the US government, with limited following and impact.

Fortunately, there is no shortage of practical ideas for reform of our public diplomacy. In a recent essay, Hady Amr and Peter W. Singer¹⁸ have brought them together in a coherent plan of action. To wage and win the war of ideas, they insist, our strategy must rest on five broad principles: dialogue rather than propaganda; genuine outreach rather than “preaching to the choir”; coordinated policies rather than today’s disjointed efforts; nimble responses to changing conditions rather than stubborn adherence to ineffective strategies; and serious investments rather than scraps from the military’s table. To implement these principles, they recommend a dozen specific steps, beginning with a broad-based process that produces a presidential National Security Directive on improving our public diplomacy in the Muslim world. In addition, the next president should take the lead in reversing

perceptions by including stops in Muslim nations in his or her early international trips. Other key steps include:

- Creating an America's Voice Corps to mobilize and train Arabic speakers with skills in public diplomacy;
- Establishing American Centers throughout the Muslim world;
- Sponsoring the translation and dissemination of key books and documents;
- Launching C-SPANs for the Muslim world;
- Bolstering cultural exchange programs while improving the visa process; and
- Developing new military exchange programs and networks.

Translating these proposals into action will require the mobilization of our human and material resources. In this vein, we must engage Arab- and Muslim-Americans in the process, incorporate public diplomacy into the Pentagon budget and get the entire federal bureaucracy to view public diplomacy as one of its core missions.¹⁹

There is good reason to wonder whether our current institutional structure is up to the job. Under pressure from then-Senator Jesse Helms, the Clinton Administration agreed to terminate the United States Information Agency. The assumption that public diplomacy was no longer important turned out to be dangerously shortsighted. As we have learned, restoring our ability to communicate with the world is an urgent priority: our failure to communicate our side of the story to the Muslim world is an ongoing threat to our security. That means we must first strengthen the institution charged with overseeing public diplomacy, either as an integral bureau at the State Department or as a restored, separate agency. It means investing that agency with leadership that has communications expertise, particularly with 21st century technologies, rather than making it a dumping ground for political patronage. And it means dramatically increasing funding.

These three steps—remodeling our civilian and military forces, rebuilding our anti-terror alliances and revitalizing our public diplomacy—will help abate the immediate threat. But if we are to bring the struggle against radical, violent Islamists to a successful long-term conclusion, we must act on a much broader front. We must deprive our adversaries of the ability to use our own conduct against us. We must adhere to the rules of war, observe due process in our legal proceedings and guard against the fact, or appearance, of hypocrisy regarding the ideals we profess and promote. And we must show a commitment to good policy in the Islamic world, especially the Arab Middle East. For example, the United States should state clearly that we seek no permanent military bases in Iraq. We should commit sufficient security and reconstruction resources to Afghanistan, champion the cause of peace between Israel and the Palestinians and align our rhetoric with our deeds in dealing with authoritarian governments in Egypt, Pakistan and throughout the region.²⁰

2. Re-Engaging the World to Counter Nuclear Proliferation

During the 2004 campaign, President Bush and Senator Kerry disagreed about many aspects of defense and foreign policy. They united, however, in identifying nuclear proliferation—in particular, the possibility that terrorists would get their hands on fissile material or a weapon—as the greatest single threat to American national security. And they were right. Not only would the human and economic costs of a single explosion in a major American city be horrendous; the fear and uncertainty following in the wake of an attack could lead to significant long-term changes in our constitutional order.

Some would downplay this threat on the grounds that it would be too difficult for terrorists to acquire weapons or the fissile material needed to construct them. Unfortunately, that is not true. As Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier point out, world stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium now amount to more than 2300 tons—enough for more than

200,000 nuclear bombs. These materials are stored in hundreds of buildings scattered over more than 40 countries, under security arrangements that are sometimes “appalling.”²¹ And while it might be difficult for terrorists to obtain or build an actual nuclear weapon, all they would need is fissile material in order to build a crude but effective nuclear device. That could be done with unclassified information and components readily available in commercial markets. Taking all of these factors into consideration, Bunn estimates that under current policies, the probability of a nuclear attack during the next decade is 29 percent.²² Well-regarded experts, such as Harvard’s Graham Allison and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, place it as high as 50 percent.²³ Even a much smaller risk would justify urgent efforts to do much more than we’re now doing.

“A single nuclear bomb in a single American city would be a nation-altering event. After the explosion of a second terrorist nuclear bomb, many urban dwellers would reconsider their decision to live in large cities. Nuclear terrorism is not only an existential threat to the idea of America it is also a threat to civilization as we know it.”

Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

What should we do? First, we need to sustain and strengthen our international obligations when it comes to nuclear weapons. The most basic risk we face now is availability. More nuclear nations means more nuclear materials available, by accident

or design, to terrorist organizations. Since the Second World War, American security guarantees have been central to preventing more nations from seeking nuclear weapons. If we react to our disappointments in Iraq by drawing back from those guarantees, the world will become more dangerous and the risks to our country will increase. And while our own nuclear stockpile is in desperate need of modernization, research on a new generation of nuclear weapons endangers this network of security guarantees. Our tradition of global engagement is not a favor we do for other nations; it is essential to our own security. This is especially clear when it comes to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

Beyond maintaining our international obligations, we need a far more comprehensive and energetic effort to protect existing nuclear stocks. That begins with a program for restricting access to, and the supply of, nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material. That means we must secure what now exists; end production of weapons-usable material; end civil research and power reactors' use of such materials; and eliminate surplus materials. It also includes stronger efforts to interdict the transfer of nuclear weapons and materials, modernize treaties to halt proliferation and offer meaningful incentives and threats to nations that threaten the global regime of nuclear controls.²⁴ More specifically, we should:

1. *Secure nuclear weapons and weapons grade materials around the world.* A great deal of progress has been made in securing and destroying the stocks of nuclear weapons materials, thanks to pioneers like Former Senator Sam Nunn, the Co-Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.²⁵ Unfortunately, as Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon have pointed out, political tensions between the United States and Russia have slowed such progress.²⁶ Since the collapse of the USSR, only half of Russia's nuclear facilities have made needed security improvements. Even after September 11th, the Bush administration failed to increase funding for this vital effort. In forging a way ahead with Russia, there will be tradeoffs to make: Russia wants some things from us (support for joining the WTO, for example), and we want some things from them (less heavy-handed interference among the neighbors). Securing the Soviet legacy arsenal should be a top priority as we negotiate these tradeoffs and a stronger strategic relationship with the next Russian president. In addition, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, highly successful in the former Soviet Union (FSU), should be implemented just as vigorously in vulnerable countries outside the FSU.
2. *Accelerate the shift from highly-enriched uranium to lower-enriched uranium in nuclear research and power reactors around the world.* Five years ago, the G8 committed itself to such an effort as part of its Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. With the United States in the lead, it's time to turn pledges into action.²⁷

3. *Improve the global ability to search and stop suspect shipments.* In the wake of September 11th, the Bush Administration established the Proliferation Security Initiative, a multilateral agreement among participating nations to use existing national laws to target suspicious ships—possibly carrying nuclear weapons or material—that enter their territorial waters. In January 2007, the President signed into law the Lugar-Obama bill, which will allow the United States to strengthen the capacity of other nations to detect and interdict the shipment of nuclear weapons and materials as well as other threats to our security. This legislation should be fully funded and aggressively implemented.
4. *Modernize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).* Updating this indispensable treaty means, among other steps, closing the current loophole that permits signatories to develop nuclear fuel production capabilities. It means making the “Additional Protocol,” which enhances the inspection and verification powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, binding on all parties to the NPT. It also means creating a global consensus against new national programs that enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium and ratifying a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.²⁸ A measure that would help in that regard is a “Nuclear Fuel Bank,” recently proposed by Senators Lugar and Bayh, which would guarantee all nations access to nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable rates, provided that they return the spent fuel for oversight by the IAEA.

As part of our effort to update the NPT, we should drop the unrealistic demand that India, Pakistan and Israel adhere to the treaty as non-nuclear powers. A better and more practical course would be getting them to accept all of the non-proliferation obligations incumbent on the five original nuclear powers. This does not mean that the goal of getting these three nations to abandon nuclear weapons would be shelved altogether. Instead, they would be expected to reduce their stockpiles in tandem with reductions the five original powers undertake.²⁹ This will be very difficult to negotiate with all signatories to the NPT, but the treaty itself will not be built on solid ground until it finds a way to deal with declared nuclear weapons states outside its purview. North Korea, as a nation that developed nuclear weapons while a party to the NPT, should be treated differently, as discussed below.

Updating the NPT will not be easy, but we cannot hope to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion unless we too are prepared to accept measures we have long rejected. For example, we will have to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as we could have done long ago without placing our nuclear weapons program at risk. More fundamentally, we will have to uphold our part of the original NPT bargain—namely, to accelerate deep cuts in US and Russian nuclear arms and to minimize their role in our overall defense. The Moscow Treaty, which Presidents Bush and Putin signed in 2002, limits each side’s long-range nuclear arsenal to about 2000 weapons. In the

view of many experts, we could cut this figure by an additional 50 percent, and make deep cuts in tactical nuclear weapons as well, with no risk to our security.³⁰

Finally, we should use the UN Security Council to strengthen the enforcement regime surrounding the NPT. Two steps are key: the Council should adopt a resolution making it clear that states withdrawing from the treaty (as they are permitted to do under Article X) remain responsible for violations committed while still parties to it. Further, the Council should adopt a resolution forbidding withdrawing states from making use of nuclear materials and facilities acquired from other nations and requiring these states to dismantle, destroy or return all such nuclear items. The Council should authorize measures, including coercion if necessary, to ensure compliance.³¹

5. *Halt and reverse nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.* With both nations, our ultimate goal is that they become productive members of the international community, rather than pernicious outsiders. This means setting aside, at least for some time, efforts to change their regimes. It also means that we must assess our military options soberly.

In the case of North Korea, the Bush Administration reached the accurate judgment that the costs of a military strike on Pyongyang's nuclear facilities would outweigh the benefits. There is little choice but to continue with diplomacy. In the long run, we may make some distasteful concessions, including offering North Korea a "grand bargain": in return for supportive US economic and energy policies as well as a formal, if limited, non-aggression pledge, the regime would agree verifiably to dismantle its nuclear program and accept stringent new NPT requirements. Kim Jong Il simply cannot continue down the path he is on forever, but regime change will have to occur as the result of economic and diplomatic pressure and as a political process driven from within. The United States should continue to work with Japan, South Korea, Russia and China toward a peaceful transition in North Korea.

Iran presents a more complicated case. Despite the Administration's continuing ambivalence on the matter, regime change is not the answer, certainly not in the short term. While sanctions may be useful as part of a negotiating strategy, they are unlikely to weaken the regime enough to promote a collapse. And even if a collapse should occur, it is by no means clear that there is a preferable alternative. External groups such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), lack serious military capabilities and enjoy minimal public support inside Iran. Moreover, the MEK is considered a terrorist organization under US law. For the most part, the internal political opposition wants reform, not revolution. While Iran has its share of restive ethnic minorities, they do not have the capacity to bring down the regime or rule in its place.³² And the acute

shortage of US troops, nearly all of which are committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, rules out a ground invasion, which would also be a diplomatic disaster.

Nor does a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities appear promising. In the first place, experts are not confident that we even know about all of those facilities, dozens of which may well be buried deep underground. Second, Tehran has multiple retaliatory options with costs we may not wish to bear for the limited gain we may get from bombing. These options include the use of medium range missiles against our troops in Iraq, the activation of Iraq Shi'a against our forces and continued presence and the destruction of key energy facilities in the Gulf.³³

Most important, a military strike would be likely to offer at most short-term relief. The expert consensus is that the Iranian regime would respond by redoubling its efforts to join the nuclear weapons club, this time with facilities that may be harder to detect and destroy. In the wake of a US strike, it is hard to imagine a package of carrots and sticks that might persuade the Iranians to stand down verifiably. Instead, the current internal debate about the merits of developing nuclear weapons would likely end with the total victory of the hardliners.

In the short to medium term, then, a negotiated solution is the best path forward, in terms of overall US security. There are two possible strategies. The first is to focus squarely on the nuclear issue by breaking the impasse over restarting talks, providing guaranteed access to international sources of nuclear reactor fuel, such as a fuel bank under IAEA control, and offering significant economic incentives. If we started down this road today, we would probably know within eighteen months whether Tehran has or has not made an irreversible decision to pursue nuclear weapons.³⁴ The second strategy is to aim for a grand bargain addressing the full range of US and Iranian concerns. For Iranians, these concerns range from lifting the US economic embargo to supporting Iran's entry into the WTO. For Americans, these concerns range from verifiably ending all nuclear weapons activity to stopping all support for terrorist groups.³⁵

The choice between these two strategies is not clear. On the one hand, it may be argued that the "grand bargain" may call upon both governments for policy shifts beyond what their internal politics can sustain. On the other hand, it may well be that the nuclear issue cannot be successfully negotiated in isolation from broader features of US-Iranian relations. This is especially likely to be true if, as some believe, Tehran is seeking nuclear weapons principally as a deterrent against the United States or as a way to be taken as a serious player, as happened with India. One thing is clear, however: absent serious prospects of regime change or effective air strikes against Iran's nuclear installations, the

real choice is between broader-based, more serious and more urgent negotiations than those presently underway and the inexorable drift toward a nuclear-armed Iran acting almost entirely outside any international rules or norms.³⁶

3. Providing Basic Energy Security

Energy security—reliable, consistent and relatively affordable access to energy supplies—is a vital dimension of national security, but our current policies are weakening this security, not strengthening it. As Senator Richard Lugar has declared, “energy is the albatross of US national security.”³⁷

Our policy is making us vulnerable for several reasons. First, oil supplies are increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters, wars and terrorist attacks. Second, many producing nations, such as Iran and Venezuela, are using their energy supplies and the huge flow of funds they create as weapons to finance anti-American propaganda, diplomacy and even terrorism. Finally the threat to use energy as a weapon is reshaping the diplomatic landscape to our disadvantage and the world’s. For example, in Europe, our allies’ dependence on imported oil informs their reluctance to stand up to Russia and Iran. In Africa, China’s energy-driven closeness with Sudan thwarts an effective global response to genocide in Darfur.

Americans widely agree that we must act boldly to reduce the risks inherent in our current energy policies and consumption patterns. And indeed, every president in the past three decades has proposed ambitious goals in this area; none has come close to achieving them. It’s time to get serious.

We must start by defining the problem accurately. It has little to do with electricity, most of which is generated from sources other than oil. Even heating our homes is responsible for only a small share of our plight. *The heart of the problem is the near-total dependence of our system of transportation on oil-based products.* According to a recent study by Brookings scholar David Sandalow, oil today provides more than 97% of the fuel for our transportation fleet, as it has for a generation.³⁸ To make meaningful progress, we must steadily reduce that number over a period of decades.

To act effectively, we must discard the illusions that have long suffused discussion of this issue:

- *Energy security is not the same as energy independence.* Even if we changed course tomorrow, we and our allies would continue to import substantial quantities of oil and other energy sources for decades to come. Even if we put a dent in our imports, if other nations do not, our energy prices—even of domestically-produced oil—will be affected by what happens in the global marketplace.

- *Energy security will not free us from commitments in the Persian Gulf.* For the foreseeable future, US military power and diplomatic influence must help secure the Gulf region against instability and terrorism.
- *Energy security does not mean lower prices.* The United States is and will remain part of the global market. As China, India and other emerging nations increase

their energy consumption, upward pressures on prices will continue and perhaps intensify—regardless of how much oil we actually import.

- *Energy security cannot be achieved with the domestic oil supply.* We cannot drill our way out of this problem. Most of the world's remaining oil sources are likely to be much more expensive to tap than are long-established fields such as Saudi Arabia and East Texas. And oil is a finite, non-renewable resource.
- *Energy security cannot be achieved with conservation measures alone.* Conservation is important, of course; but even with a maximum effort over the next twenty years, our demand for energy will almost certainly increase.³⁹

Ultimately, if energy security is the goal, we can attain it only by reducing energy risks. This means adopting the kinds of risk-reduction strategies that apply in other areas. We must in effect purchase insurance against major disruptions. And we must diversify our energy portfolio to reduce the impact of unfavorable developments in any single source. At the same time, we should redouble our efforts to encourage energy conservation, including new technologies that enhance energy efficiency.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve has long served as our first line of defense against sudden supply disruptions. It has not outlived its usefulness. We should act on suggestions from both sides of the aisle to increase its capacity. The President has called for doubling the SPR over the next 20 years, which would increase stockpiles from 55 days of oil imports to 97. (20 years ago, by contrast, the Reserve represented 118 days of imports.) If we can hit the goal of doubling it in less than two decades, we should. And we should expand its range as well to include processed petroleum products, not just crude oil.

The government can also improve our oil insurance system by making fuller use of sophisticated financial instruments and procedures that have proliferated in the private market in recent decades. These possibilities include futures contracts, which forward-looking corporations such as Southwest Airlines have used effectively to hedge against fuel price increases; and also “swaps,” which would enable the government to release oil to private entities in return for future delivery of larger quantities, in effect increasing the size of the SPR without additional congressional appropriations. (The Department of Energy already has the authority to do this but has been deterred by the private sector’s skepticism.)

Diversification of energy supplies is another key milestone for energy security. There are three main strategies for diversifying supplies:

- *Facilitate the introduction of new LNG and other forms of natural gas from abroad into our country.* This will require new pipelines linking the United States with Canada and Mexico. It also means new regulations making projects that serve the long-term national interest less vulnerable to local interest-group pressures. At the same time, we have to make LNG terminals less of a security risk than they currently are.
- *Use tax incentives and market-based mechanisms to accelerate the transition to energy diversity.*
 - 1. We should expand production of ethanol from corn and biomass, with a target of replacing the equivalent of at least 5 million barrels/day of oil within 20 years.** This would require the retrofitting of at least one quarter of the nation's service stations with ethanol-friendly pumps. Using current tax credits for renewal fuel pumps, this would cost the major oil companies about \$650 million over ten years—far less than one percent of the profits the three largest oil companies made in 2006. Expanding the use of ethanol and other alternative fuels would also require us to establish a floor price for crude oil in the neighborhood of \$45-50 to ensure that temporary downward spikes in oil prices do not slow the transition toward a more diversified energy portfolio. Any funds generated through this mechanism should be used to subsidize energy research and development and to accelerate the introduction of new technologies.
 - 2. We should introduce flexible-fuel and hybrid plug-in automobiles as quickly as possible.** For example, David Sandalow has proposed a federal commitment to provide \$6,000 in fully refundable tax credits to the purchasers of the first million flex fuel plug-in hybrids. This could be financed with a phased-in 20-cent/gallon increase in the federal gasoline tax. While the public opposes such a tax for general purchase, a solid majority would support it if the proceeds were dedicated to reducing our dependence on oil.⁴⁰
 - 3. We should use high-speed rail to reduce the growth of air traffic, which is emerging as a major source of carbon dioxide emission.** This strategy, which would require significant up-front capital investments, is especially promising as a replacement for regional flights.
- *Do more to promote the construction of new nuclear power plants.* Public concern about nuclear power spiked after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and the emergence of serious waste disposal problems. Leading environmentalists such as former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt have argued that nuclear power must play a larger role in our energy future. As House Speaker Nancy Pelosi

recently declared in testimony before a congressional committee, circumstances have changed, technology has improved, the need to broaden our energy portfolio has increased and concern about the link between carbon emissions and global warming has skyrocketed. It is time, she concluded, to reopen a long-closed question and rethink the contribution that nuclear power can make to a 21st century energy policy. We agree.

Conservation is another important measure, and while conservation alone will not solve our energy insecurity, it is an indispensable step toward mitigating our vulnerability to price shocks. There is a range of conservation measures for the residential and industrial sectors, but again, it is transportation where the greatest gains can be made in the near term. Corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards helped improve the fuel efficiency of the US auto fleet in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but neither standards nor average fuel efficiency have changed much in the past quarter century. It is time to renew and revitalize these long-stalled efforts. The most sensible approach would be to increase the CAFE standards by 4 percent (roughly 1 mile/gallon) per year, unless the auto industry could make a compelling case that doing so would be technologically or economically infeasible.

Today, US demand for oil is about 22 million barrels per day, of which about 12 million are imported. If current trends were to continue unchecked, in 20 years US demand would grow to 28 million barrels, of which we would have to import fully 20 million. By contrast, if the proposals outlined above were implemented, imports would be down by at least 50 percent, to 5-6 million barrels/day, rather than up by two-thirds, from 12 to 20 million.⁴¹ The result: an economy far less exposed to sudden oil shocks, and a foreign policy far less beholden to large producers.

There would be another benefit as well. Today, oil accounts for fully 42 percent of the world's energy-related carbon dioxide emissions—even more than coal—and the average US car puts more than 1.5 tons of carbon into the air each year.⁴² By diversifying our sources of energy and reducing our consumption of oil, we could become a world leader in the struggle to contain global warming.

4. Protecting the Global Commons

Prosperity and democracy are out of reach for many nations, but responsiveness to basic needs and human dignity should be in reach for every nation. While it is tempting to see lowering the level of human misery around the world as a task that is neither America's responsibility nor within our ability to achieve, the United States should work with other nations to establish a new understanding of "global decency"—basic standards all governments are expected to uphold. A global decency standard is an important part of American leadership, not strictly because it is morally right, but also because it is in our interests to promote stability and prosperity. In the age of globalization, America's fortunes are greatly improved when we have partners

in prosperity around the world, and our security is directly put at risk when human misery destabilizes other regions. The United States should, therefore, take the lead in reaching agreement with other nations on a Global Decency Agenda. This is obviously a topic that demands its own full length report. We will not do it justice in these pages, but will instead touch lightly on what we believe should be a few of the top US priorities for such an agenda.

- *Global Climate Change.* There are few global challenges that present more of a threat to human welfare than global warming, and yet there is still no significant domestic plan or sufficient international agreement for mitigation or response—thanks in no small measure to the Bush Administration’s refusal to deal with this issue. Indeed, the urgency of climate change goes beyond environmental concerns; it is a direct threat to our national security, according to a recent report by a panel of retired flag-rank military officers.⁴³

There are three main ways in which the United States should address global climate change: with a domestic plan to reduce carbon emissions; with a strategy for managing the consequences of climate change; and finally by leading the way to a new global concord on reducing emissions.⁴⁴

A domestic plan to reduce carbon emissions will overlap considerably with a domestic plan to increase America’s energy security. The promotion of alternative fuels and conservation measures, for example, especially for the transportation sector, serves both goals. Indeed, an aggressive carbon reduction plan would take these measures even further for the transportation

“We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today... or we’ll pay the price later in military terms. And that will involve human lives.”

General Anthony C. Zinni (USMC, ret)⁴⁵

sector and tackle areas such as land use planning, consumer preferences and modal shifts from road to rail. A solid domestic plan will commit far more resources to the research, development and demonstration of new science and technology for reducing carbon use and emissions, from cutting edge energy efficiency measures for electric generating plants to hydrogen-fueled cars. We should also commit to a national cap on US carbon emissions, backed up by mandatory caps on major emitters. To do so, we should harness market mechanisms to enforce such limits in the most economically efficient way possible (through the sort of emissions-trading schemes that have been yielding some positive results in Europe, for example⁴⁶). Finally, we need to promote carbon capture and sequestration measures.

sector and tackle areas such as land use planning, consumer preferences and modal shifts from road to rail. A solid domestic plan will commit far more resources to the research, development and demonstration of new science and technology for reducing carbon use and emissions, from cutting edge energy efficiency

Even with an aggressive national plan for reducing carbon emissions, global warming will continue, and there are likely to be consequences for the US. Indeed, there is some evidence that we are already seeing the consequences in everything from disappearing Polar Bear habitat⁴⁷ to the rise of killer hurricanes.⁴⁸ Therefore, we also need a “national adaptation strategy” for dealing with the consequences of global warming.⁴⁹ According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, those consequences will range from drought to sea level changes.⁵⁰ A national strategy would have to include: identification of regions in the US likely to be most affected by drought, water shortages, coastal flooding and other climate change effects; a range of responses to regional shortages of water and other resources; improvements in emergency response for everything from fires and heat waves to extreme weather; and improved early warning systems.

Finally, the United States cannot fight global warming alone; there must be international cooperation, both in cutting back greenhouse gases and in dealing with the consequences. This is more than an instance where the world looks to America to lead; as the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases, America has a moral imperative to lead. Under the Bush Administration, the United States has done exactly the opposite. At this juncture, the most important action the United States can take to lead the world in this fight is to cut emissions at home; the second most important action is to spearhead a new global concord, which would include a market-based global emissions reduction regime, transfer of and collaboration on cutting-edge “green” technologies (particularly with China and India) and disaster relief and early warning assistance to countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

- *Improve human welfare.* All nations should make tangible commitments to protecting and improving human dignity—and 192 have, by agreeing to United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. These goals, backed up by specific, measurable and time-constrained targets, include eliminating extreme hunger and poverty, fighting disease, reducing child mortality, improving the health and wellbeing of women, improving access to education and promoting environmental sustainability. Progress on meeting the targets has been uneven, however: Eastern Asia, for example, has already met its 2015 target for cutting extreme poverty, but sub-Saharan Africa has actually lost ground.⁵¹

While the United States has assisted other nations in meeting their goals through foreign aid, the Bush Administration has avoided using the goals as a measure of success of US policy, and no legislation formalizing the goals as a matter of US policy has been enacted. The Administration has also been increasingly quiet about meeting US obligations. One of the Millennium Development Goals is to develop a stronger global partnership for development, including by promoting free trade and good governance and

by increasing levels of foreign aid. The United States should strive to meet the Millennium Development Goal of devoting at least .7 percent of national income to foreign aid. We should also continue to promote free trade, particularly the negotiations surrounding the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization, even though that may mean some difficult tradeoffs for some parts of the American economy.

The American effort to promote good governance actually points to a more serious barrier to a Global Decency Agenda, and that is our own bureaucratic impediments. Rather than reform or modernize existing institutions to meet the Millennium Development Goal of good governance, the Bush Administration created a new organization: the Millennium Challenge Corporation. From its inception, the MCC has seen declining levels of executive and legislative commitment and interest, even when its programs have been successful. This inconsistent and stovepiped approach is fairly typical of the US foreign aid landscape. Indeed, a recent, definitive study of US foreign aid by the Brookings Institution found that the lack of coherence in the US foreign assistance system is seriously undermining America's leadership role in the world.⁵² The same report pointed out that the US could distribute aid far more rationally, particularly in leveraging international trade and commerce; many nations we give aid to are well positioned to benefit from greater trade and foreign direct investment. A significant restructuring of US foreign policy and foreign aid, as recommended below, will be crucial to improving human welfare.

- *Fight corruption.* According to the World Bank, corruption is one of the most significant barriers to economic and social development around the world. Moreover, corruption exacts a disproportionate toll on the poor, according to Transparency International. Corruption also dampens public faith in governments, and sometimes in democracy in general.

The United States considers fighting corruption to be a high priority, but has a fractured and unstable institutional ability to promote anti-corruption programs. In addition to sustaining a plethora of programs in several bureaucracies, the Bush Administration also charged the Millennium Challenge Corporation with using corruption as one of the key criteria for disbursing aid. The MCC was never reconciled with the other programs, however, and was not created in full cooperation with either Congress or the universe of non-governmental organizations active in this area.

Given the relative importance of this issue, the US should establish a far more coherent effort to fight corruption, and fully fund that effort. Moreover, the Administration's inconsistency on this issue—the President has proven far too willing to look the other way at home and in bilateral relations—has undermined American credibility.

- *Prevent genocide.* During the past two decades, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to act against gross violations of human rights, including genocide, in a timely and effective way. Such inaction is morally unacceptable, and the United States should take the lead to end it.

First, Congress should pass and the President should sign the Genocide Accountability Act. Giving US courts universal jurisdiction over genocide cases makes an important statement of our commitment to fighting this crime, and adds an important international mechanism for enforcing accountability for such crimes.

Second, we should initiate a fundamental shift in the architecture of the international system. All UN members should accept a “responsibility to protect” their own citizens from “avoidable catastrophe”—mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.⁵³

Of course, even if all members of the UN agree to this, they will not all meet their obligations. To address situations in which member-states grossly fail to discharge their responsibility to protect, there must be a new mechanism that permits the timely mobilization of international forces. The Darfur fiasco is conclusive proof—if more proof were needed—that the current system is an immoral failure. Only a small UN- African Union peacekeeping force and statements of outrage stand between the victims of genocide in Darfur and the government-backed perpetrators. The United States must take the lead in creating alternative international mechanisms—either a rapid reaction force within NATO, a more robust UN peacekeeping operation or a new caucus or concert of democratic countries with a commitment and capability to mobilize forces.

5. Creating a 21st Century Military

In February 2007, the new Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, presented to Congress a staggering defense budget request of \$700 billion dollars—and then called it a small amount, in relative terms. The Secretary’s point of comparison was the percent of GDP: defense spending is 4 percent now, compared to 9.4 percent at the height of the Vietnam War, 14.2 percent with Korea, and 37.8 percent with World War II.⁵⁴ Our economy, of course, is also much larger than it was in those days; 4 percent gets us much further now than it did in 1945. Still, the Secretary of Defense had a point. Consider that in the last six months, North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon for the first time, proving that a known proliferator has joined the nuclear family. Iran has defied repeated UN calls to halt its uranium enrichment, whipping up popular nationalism and according to the International Atomic Energy Agency is rapidly mastering the technology of the enrichment process. China has successfully tested a

new anti-satellite ballistic missile, possibly signaling an intention to make space a theater of future conflict, and certainly a theater of competition. Russian President Vladimir Putin, flush with petrodollars, has sounded as though he's calling for a new Cold War. Al Qaeda's leadership is reconstituting in western Pakistan and continues to instigate attacks around the world via the Internet and satellite television coverage. The Taliban in Afghanistan and a mix of fighters in Iraq are targeting both local leadership and US political will with crude explosive devices and small-arms ambushes, with a high potential for regional destabilization.

The most urgent problem we face with the military is that the United States does not have the right force structure to deal with the three main challenges of the day (al Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq), let alone the longer-term threats to our security. The shortfall is both quantitative and qualitative and applies to both conventional and unconventional warfare. The quantitative problem is that the United States simply lacks enough personnel to staff these missions. The qualitative problem is that the United States lacks the right mix of capabilities and weapons platforms to defeat or deter those who wish us ill. This situation calls for immediate quantitative and qualitative changes:

- *Increase the size of the force.* The United States simply needs more ground forces. Current requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan and in fighting al Qaeda are putting tremendous strain on the US Armed Forces, with dramatic declines in overall military readiness. Democrats have been calling for the addition of 100,000 ground forces for years;⁵⁵ the President finally followed suit in January 2007. Opponents of this increase claim that either the United States will soon complete operations in Iraq and is unlikely to invade and occupy any other nation, meaning that we will not need so many personnel. Other analyses have pointed to high costs: the proposed troop increase will cost an estimated \$100 billion over six years.⁵⁶ The United States is likely to remain a global leader, however, with extensive international commitments. That includes current operations, which are likely to persist in some form for many years to come, and other missions, such as stopping genocide in Darfur and stabilizing the area. Other contingencies are possible if not likely, such as collapse in North Korea or increasing conflict in Nigeria, to which the United States will have to respond. These unconventional needs, from reconstruction, to peacekeeping, to covert operations, are labor-intensive. As for the high costs of personnel, the strategic needs should be driving spending decisions, not the other way around. If the United States needs more personnel in order to protect and promote its interests, then we will have to fund more personnel.
- *Recruit personnel for 21st century missions.* Given that the US is likely to continue to be engaged in unconventional missions, the military needs to devote more billets to appropriate skills, such as civil-military relations, linguists, Special Operations Forces, intelligence and military police.

- *Fully fund the recovery of the US military.* US troops and equipment are battered, and it will be costly to restore them to battle readiness. So-called “reset costs” for the Army alone are estimated to be \$17.1 billion for Fiscal Year 2007, an investment that will have to be continued for several years.⁵⁷
- *Be ready for conventional and future conflicts.* The United States cannot fund and prepare for unconventional war at the cost of our ability to wage a conventional war. A nation such as Iran or North Korea could decide to attack key US interests, or a peer competitor could arise. Though the US is highly unlikely to go to war with Russia or China, the road ahead for both nations is far from clear. This means we must have the conventional means to fight a regional state now, and be engaging in the research, development and demonstration to deal with challenges these nations may present. So whatever the much-discussed “Revolution in Military Affairs” may amount to, it has to go beyond substituting technology-based concepts for troops.

Even with all of these requirements, Secretary Gates may not be correct to suggest that the United States needs to devote a significantly greater share of its GDP to defense. Right now, US defense spending rivals the total reached at the height of World War II, and while war itself has not become more expensive, the way America fights certainly has. On the other hand, there is no reason why the United States today should continue to invest in legacy Cold War systems—of weapons and personnel—more suited to mass armies facing off on open fields. If we fail to reconsider these commitments, then new systems will just be piled on top of the old, and Secretary Gates will be right. If we have the courage to ask tough questions, make reasonable risk calculations, and find the will to act on evidence-based answers, then \$700 billion should be more than enough.

6. Gathering 21st Century Intelligence

The American intelligence community was created to monitor the Soviet empire—a large, closed system. Such work required stealing secrets, the classic stuff of espionage. In the Cold War, the Intelligence Community knew who the enemy was and what had to be learned about it. There were enormous advantages to this stability—it allowed the formation of an organization that mirrored the enemy. We watched it—and even imitated it—for the purpose of protecting America.

In the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, a large number of high-level groups, inside and outside the government, undertook the task of thinking about how to reshape the intelligence community for a world with no Soviet Union. Many of these efforts were worthy, but a comprehensive review by the political scientist Amy Zegart found that very few of the recommendations were ever adopted. For much of the 1990s, reform in the intelligence community consisted mostly of lip service.

Although people knew that there had to be change, the absence of a crisis made it hard to achieve.

Then came 9/11. By September 12, 2001 it was clear that the intelligence community had failed. The organizations that had won the Cold War were paper tigers when it came to the war against terror. To even the most casual outside observer it was clear that fundamental reform would be needed to fight this new war—a war in which we often didn't even know the enemy's name, let alone his location. And yet, the Bush Administration's calls for reform were slow and halting. To this day, according to one former intelligence community officer, "The Soviet Union is still alive and well in the cultures and in the bureaucratic authorities of the IC [intelligence community]."⁵⁸

The sole response of the Bush Administration to the need for massive organizational rethinking has been to create, under pressure from the 9/11 families, the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI). This is a top down approach to a problem that needs to be addressed from the bottom up; the intelligence community needs to change the way it does business—and more to the point the way it shares information—at the operative and analyst level, with a stronger chain of command. Indeed, the DNI is the quintessential political fix to a political problem: it generates the illusion of action while creating exactly what the intelligence community does not need—more bureaucracy and a weaker chain of command. Its first leader, John Negroponte, left the post having served a little less than a year, barely enough to scratch the surface of the reforms that were needed.

The next President will have to conduct a complete overhaul of the intelligence community if it is to function well in a world where our national security threats know no boundaries. Indeed, terrorism is only one of several national security crises that cross borders: organized crime, trafficking in strategic materials, genocidal outbursts that demand intervention and environmental threats such as famine, disease and water scarcity will all have serious national security repercussions. The national security picture of the 21st century will be characterized by massive uncertainty, as the intelligence community itself has observed.⁵⁹ The intelligence apparatus that informs policy therefore must be more accurate than it has been, but it will also have to provide more knowledge based on sophisticated analysis. In order for the community to succeed where it has been failing, it will need the right people, it will need to be able to keep those people and it will have to remove institutional barriers to success.

- *Recruit the right people.* Ultimately, the only way to improve the failings of the intelligence community is to recruit top talent with the right skills. For that to happen, intelligence needs to be a more attractive career field for top graduates across the country, and universities need to turn out more graduates with the right skill set for intelligence work. One way to address both shortcomings is for Congress to pass a National Intelligence Education Act,

- which would fund more scholarship in the history, culture, politics and particularly languages of critical regions. This legislation could include a program similar to the military's ROTC, adapted for intelligence analysts. This act could include incentives and bonuses for people in particularly critical areas, and disincentives should be removed; the lengthy clearance process for native speakers of critical languages, for example, could be made far more efficient without sacrificing security precautions.
- *Retain and train the right people.* A strong recruiting pipeline is not enough; the intelligence community must improve how it treats people in the system and keep their skills and knowledge fresh and cutting-edge. Right now, Byzantine business practices, combined with a culture that discourages risk-taking, can chase talent out of the system, demoralize those who stay and isolate individuals who should be sharing information. First, the intelligence community should take a number of steps to rationalize business practices—by standardizing the security clearance process and information technologies across the community, for example. It is not enough to break down walls, however; the community needs to actively promote and reward collaborative work. That means using personnel policies, such as promotions and bonuses, to encourage employees to rotate through different institutions and cooperate within the community (between analysts who focus on a specific region and analysts who focus on a specific threat, for example) and with external actors. The latter is particularly important; the intelligence community cannot possibly keep track of an ever changing threat unless it develops extensive links with local police, representatives of other national governments, academics, international business and policymakers. It is no accident that terrorist plans such as the infamous “Bojinka plot” (the 1995 plan to bring down 11 airliners) have been intercepted not by armies, but by alert cops on the beat. These links must include analysts and operatives with dissenting views; thinking outside the box should be encouraged and rewarded, not swept under the rug and hidden from policymakers. Finally, intelligence professionals need to have better access to continuous education and training than they currently do, given the ever shifting and uncertain nature of the threats. A National Intelligence University, similar to the military war colleges, with greater career mobility for those who attend courses, would be an important addition.
 - *Remove institutional barriers.* First, the chain of command in the intelligence community must be clarified. To date, the National Director for Intelligence has not helped address the community's shortcomings to any great degree; it has mostly just added a new layer of bureaucracy. Only the concerted focus of the leadership of the Administration and Congress can fix this problem. In the process of sorting out internal relationships in the intelligence community, the CIA should be singled out as the premier source of both collection and sense-

making—that is, the extraction of useful analysis from raw intelligence. Strengthening the CIA in this way will also mean strengthening the link between those who collect the intelligence and those who analyze it, with the end result that the agency is collecting information that is more germane to national priorities and policies. Finally, the intelligence community must be encouraged to gather information in new ways. For example, “open source” materials are far more important than they were in the 20th century. Indeed, much of what is produced as “intelligence” is already open source or, as one policy maker put it “CNN 24 hours early.” The community should create a top flight open source capacity, perhaps at the State Department, that is presented daily and alongside the secret PDB (President’s Daily Brief). The community also needs an institutional capability to learn from its own mistakes, similar to the military’s systematic “after-action reviews.” A Center for Intelligence Lessons Learned would help the community to be more innovative, in the long run.

7. Overhauling Homeland Security

One of the biggest changes brought about by 9/11 was the need for the American government to think seriously about the safety of the nation’s borders. Bounded by two oceans and two friendly nations, we have rarely had to confront this concern. Indeed, America went through two world wars without any real danger of invasion. “Homeland security” was, until 9/11, a rather abstract concept.

The events of 9/11 changed all that. Before then, worries about the borders had been confined to how best to fight the war on drugs and simultaneously keep trade flowing. After 9/11, Americans had to confront the possibility that a small nuclear device could be smuggled into the country and cause catastrophic damage, or that terrorists could explode tanker trucks or stationary storage tanks, spewing a plume of highly toxic hydrofluoric acid for miles around.⁶⁰

While the Administration has argued (contrary to the evidence of the London and Madrid bombings) that we’re fighting terrorists in Iraq so that we won’t have to fight them here at home, it has quietly taken steps to make the homeland less vulnerable—but these protective efforts have taken a back seat, at best. As Stephen Flynn puts it, sometimes “the best defense is a good defense.”⁶¹ A plausible institutional focus for this strategic defensive effort came in a proposal included in the prescient, pre-9/11 Hart/Rudman Report—namely, a Department of Homeland Security. It took months for the Bush Administration to agree to legislation to create the Department, but under pressure from congressional Democrats, it finally came into being in the fall of 2002.

At the core of the Department was a massive undertaking—making the borders safer than they had ever been. A major handicap was that the Bush Administration was ideologically ill-equipped for such an undertaking, given its distaste for government. And indeed, they failed to devote sufficient attention and resources to

the new Department, with little reaction from Congress. Another handicap was the longstanding dysfunctional management and infighting among the federal employees at our nation's borders; immigration and customs have never functioned as a coherent border entity. The border problem was, and remains, a problem of mind-boggling complexity.

Securing the nation's borders should have been the basic mission of the new department. Instead, the new Department became a mares' nest of 22 disparate agencies. The GAO placed the entire department on its High Risk list for bureaucratic failure almost as soon as it was created. (Most Cabinet agencies have pieces of their organization on the list—not the whole thing!) After only two years, DHS had become a bureaucratic nightmare, as the citizens of New Orleans

discovered when FEMA, one of the many agencies thrown into this department, failed to provide adequate emergency assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

It is time to face the facts. DHS is simply too big to be managed. The next president needs to take a realistic look at it and make the following sensible changes:

- *Reconstitute the Department with a focus on border patrol.* This will allow the Secretary to focus on the biggest vulnerability America has in the post 9/11 world—the vulnerability of our borders.
- *Remove FEMA from DHS and restore it as an independent agency with direct access to the President.* Emergency response is too big and too complex to be dealt with in a department that is really about border protection. It should never have been there in the first place. In the aftermath to 9/11, we were so taken by the importance of being able to respond to a terrorist attack that we forgot a basic lesson, which Hurricane Katrina brought home. In most fundamental ways, when it comes to *response*, a disaster is a disaster is a disaster. A careless, distraught worker high on drugs at a nuclear plant can be as deadly as a terrorist with a dirty bomb. Afterwards, there are people who need medicine, food and water and places that need cleaning up.

“Terrorism will increasingly be like the flu: the only thing we can safely predict is that each season there will be new strains. Thus it is only prudent to bolster the odds that our immune system can successfully fend off the known strains. This requires our identifying the most likely and attractive targets and striving to protect them from potential attacks”

Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster

Including FEMA in DHS blurred its mission and focus; a not unusual occurrence when an independent agency is folded into enormous a large new department. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, warnings were issued by GAO and by a host of state and local emergency preparedness planners that FEMA's preparedness mission was getting lost in layers of bureaucracy. When FEMA's state grant making process got rolled into an overall departmental grant making process, states found that they could get grants to buy protective gear against a bio-chemical attack but they could not get grants for more traditional and probable threats like flood mitigation. As FEMA's mission was blurred and its autonomy stripped away it also began to lose its human capital, as skilled disaster relief professionals left in frustration.

By the time Katrina made landfall, FEMA had spent slightly over two years buried in DHS. Its vision was blurred, its morale sapped, its talent gone, its leadership weak and even non-existent. Those who remained were uncertain of their own authority and their relationship to the rest of the government. It is no surprise that so many mistakes were made and that so much confusion reigned.

- *Create a seamless information sharing network.* This will allow local police, FBI, international intelligence agents and border patrol employees to have real time access to threat information without the bureaucratic bottlenecks that prevented the government from knowing what was happening in the weeks before 9/11. This is perhaps the most important function in the government today and it has been severely hampered by DHS' poor leadership and reputation for incompetence. But the creation of this kind of network, which has worked in the United Kingdom to disrupt terrorist plots, is the only way to foil an enemy that adapts on a continuous basis.

It makes sense to focus on defending the high-value domestic targets that would be most appealing to terrorists. But more than five years after 9/11, no list of such targets yet exists, and no criteria for the development of such a list have been laid out. It should be easy to proceed. Common sense tells us that chemical facilities near urban centers, the electric grid, oil and gas facilities, major ports, and the food supply are among the most lethal or destructive targets. Once we have identified key targets, we can minimize our vulnerability by hardening them, increasing redundancy, decreasing response and repair time, or redesigning or relocating them to reduce their lethality.⁶²

8. Taking on State Building

The opening years of the 21st century have shown that the United States needs a new foreign policy competency. From Afghanistan to Iraq and beyond to Darfur and other contingencies, the United States has an abiding national interest in shaping, stabilizing and reconstructing failing states or post-conflict societies. Such states are

particularly vulnerable to exploitation by transnational criminal and terrorist networks and unfriendly states hostile to the US and our interests. Moreover, instability rarely stays contained in one place. Indeed, one lesson of 9/11 was particularly clear: what happened in Afghanistan did not stay in Afghanistan.

At the same time, physical security is essential for economic stability in today's interdependent system. Minimizing the effect of regional unrest, therefore, will be a key national and economic security goal in the 21st century—for the United States and for all nations that gain from globalization.

9/11 and its aftermath taught another important lesson: the United States lacks the capabilities to carry out shape, stabilize and reconstruct missions. For that to change, the US government must reform its civilian agencies and ramp up cooperation with other nations.

Today, many civilian agencies have a role in executing foreign policy—indeed, too many: more than 50 separate government units execute America's foreign policy, often with unclear lines of authority.⁶³ The main actor, however, is the Department of State, which is increasingly irrelevant to today's challenges.

The traditional mission of the State Department is to conduct US diplomacy and international negotiations, issue passports and visas and promote the US economy.⁶⁴ The Department also has oversight of public diplomacy abroad and foreign aid, which is managed by a semi-autonomous agency, USAID—although it has become increasingly less autonomous in the Bush years.

The last major, successful overhaul of the Department of State occurred in 1961, to tweak what was largely a 19th century bureaucracy into fighting shape for the Cold War. In the years since, Congress has added scores of earmarks and mandates and collapsed affiliated agencies into main State. Secretaries of State have shifted resources around and reshuffled the bureaucracy. Each president has added programs and offices. New functions have been added, but very little has been removed, pruned or fundamentally reshaped.⁶⁵ The result is a stovepiped department, one more prepared to deal with the centralized, state-based challenges of a bygone era than the dispersed, complex challenges of the day.

In 1986, Congress passed the "Goldwater-Nichols Act,"⁶⁶ which fundamentally reshaped the institutional structure of the military. The legislation paved the way for the joint military operations that have dramatically increased America's military effectiveness today. It succeeded because Congress and the Administration cooperated and had the political will to force change. As the next presidential election approaches, there will be scores of studies that propose reforms the new president could make at the State Department. The premier study⁶⁷ in the last election cycle was mostly implemented in the opening years of the Bush Administration. But that effort

clearly did not go far enough. The Department of State does not need more studies; it needs a Goldwater-Nichols Act.⁶⁸

That reform effort has to start with the Department's most important asset—its people. Diplomacy and foreign aid are heavily dependent on human capital. Right now, the nation invests considerable resources in attracting talented people to the Foreign Service and training them in foreign language skills and culture and increasingly in recent years, in leadership and management. Neither these personnel nor the nation is getting a good return on the investment, however. As a result, America is unable to staff the President's highest foreign policy priority—Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. In addition to recent reforms, the State Department should:

- *Recruit the right people.* Working in cooperation with Congress, the Administration needs to change how the nation recruits its foreign aid talent. The emphasis needs to be on certain concrete skill sets, not just on information management.⁶⁹ Moreover, reconstruction and stabilization missions are labor intensive, and yet the Department's workforce has not expanded significantly. Thousands of new personnel are needed. In addition, a reserve corps of skilled civilians—proposals for expansion, such as Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon's call for a corps of 10,000—would help augment certain short run, high intensity missions, such as disaster relief.⁷⁰
- *Retain the right people.* Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel practices (e.g., promotions and bonuses) need to reflect performance in 21st century missions, not just foreign language ability, and should also reflect joint appointments either in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, military commands or other civilian agencies.⁷¹

Personnel are an important starting point, but improvements in this area will fall short without a structural overhaul of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. The practical result of a stovepiped and moribund State Department is two fold. First, the Department of Defense has stepped into the breach.⁷² Increasingly, military members—at the leadership level and in the field—are filling diplomatic functions. The military is the only institution with sufficient personnel, funding and maneuverability to carry out these missions, particularly in the dangerous conditions in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

The second practical effect of State's deficiencies is that critical diplomatic and foreign aid tasks are not being done well. Diplomacy and the delivery of aid is not, after all, the primary mission for the military, so troops may not be trained for the tasks at hand, or they may be diverted to warfighting missions, leaving unfinished business behind. Moreover, other nations may not be as open to diplomatic and aid overtures from armed soldiers. In other cases, there may be no one filling the breach at all. No

agency other than the State Department works primarily in public diplomacy, for example, and State does not do it very well.⁷³

Right now, the Department is largely divided into regional and functional bureaus, with the regional bureaus being the high-prestige domestic posts for Foreign Service Officers. This structure is redundant and nearly guarantees policy conflicts, which leads to decision-making bottlenecks and lowest-common-denominator compromises. The public diplomacy function is mostly a backwater viewed as secondary in importance, and USAID, the main mechanism for the delivery of foreign aid, has been bypassed in recent years, with resources diverted to security assistance and new institutions, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation. This reflects some ideological distaste for foreign aid in the Bush Administration, but it also reflects USAID's murky mission and reputation for incompetence. Moreover, planning across the Department and internal and external coordination require considerable time and resources, and the Department barely has the personnel to keep up with the crisis of the day.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has already created a Deputy Secretary for Foreign Aid, with oversight for USAID, although this move was not statutory. Right now, this individual does not have any control over select major aid portfolios, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Foreign Aid director should have policy oversight for all foreign aid—including the pieces of foreign aid executed by other Federal agencies, such as security assistance—harmonizing US policy and foreign aid.

We recommend a sweeping remodeling of the foreign aid system—a possible new structure could include the following actions:

- *Create a unified foreign aid organization.* Congress and the Administration should work together to formalize the current Deputy Secretary for Foreign Aid, either as part of the State Department or as a separate cabinet-level agency. The leadership of this department, supported by a top-flight staff, should be responsible for harmonizing foreign aid with overall national security policy and with State Department programs and practices.
- *Create three different, semi-autonomous agencies within the Department of Foreign Aid.* Long-term humanitarian programs, short-term good governance programs and emergency response programs should be separate bureaucracies, with their own leadership, budget, planning and dedicated staff, under the Department of Foreign Aid. Each of these agencies would cover very different but equally important kinds of foreign aid, when it comes to stabilization and reconstruction, and the Departmental Foreign Aid staff and leadership would help manage connections between them, as well as between them and the rest of the Department of State. These three semi-autonomous organizations would include a streamlined version of the current Agency for International Development, with a focus on long-term and humanitarian aid; a

Millennium Challenge Corporation, which would focus on more short-term good governance projects; and a Stabilization and Reconstruction agency for more responsive post conflict and disaster relief operations and missions.

In addition to strengthening the State Department internally, the relative position of the Department needs to be strengthened in the interagency community. An increase in budget and personnel will help, but there also needs to be tougher connective tissue. Many shape, stabilize and reconstruct missions are both civilian and military in nature⁷⁴—Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, have involved reconstruction occurring simultaneously with combat—but the capability for combined civil-military operations is largely dependent on personality at this point. Key fixes should include:

- *Create a new Senior Director for Civil-Military Affairs at the National Security Council.* This office could take the lead in coordinating the cooperation between civilian and military agencies.⁷⁵
- *Establish a new sub-command at the Joint Forces Command.* The role of this command would be to conduct combined planning and training for civil-military operations. A new sub-command at Joint Forces Command, with a civilian deputy, as well as new training courses at the National Defense University and Foreign Service Institute would be important additions.
- *Strengthen the role of Ambassadors and Political Advisors.* Ambassadors, or Chiefs of Mission, should have oversight authority over all activities in-country, including security assistance, humanitarian and development assistance, special operations exercises and other programs and operations.⁷⁶ Political Advisors at Combatant Commands should be a part of a joint civil-military command structure, not just ad hoc advisors, with elements of the regional bureaus forward deployed to support them. State's "Regional Strategic Initiative," which brought together regional Assistant Secretaries at the State Department, Ambassadors in-country, Political Advisors and Combatant Commanders, should be institutionalized and conducted regularly to coordinate counter-terror activities.⁷⁷

9. Promoting Democracy the Right Way

The Bush years have been hard times for the friends of democracy; the recent record of democracy promotion is bleak. First, the invasion of Iraq—ostensibly to bring democratic government to a long-oppressed people—has undermined confidence in America's competence and motives. The elections in the Palestinian territories further weakened world—and particularly Middle Eastern—confidence in the link between democratization and peace. The gap between this Administration's pro-democratic rhetoric and its renewed embrace of autocrats—in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among others—has given rise to charges of hypocrisy. And the triumphalist tone of

the President's second inaugural address has inadvertently strengthened other nations' resistance to legitimate American democracy-promotion efforts.

These developments constitute a double misfortune. A more democratic world would be more peaceful, more prosperous and more decent. Moreover, it would promote America's core security interests. It would be self-defeating to abandon the cause of global democratization. Rather, we must renew its legitimacy by revising our strategy in the following ways:

- *Establish that it is US policy to promote democracy through peaceful means alone.* This does not mean that sovereignty is inviolate. For example, nations that engage in genocide become subject to legitimate intervention. But intervention for the purpose of removing and replacing a non-democratic regime neither serves our interests nor honors our principles.
- *Create sustainable democratic institutions.* While our involvement in Iraq has taken attention away from our responsibilities in Afghanistan, we cannot allow its fledgling democracy to fail. As Michael McFaul has said, "The new regime in Afghanistan must succeed. Afghanistan is our new West Germany."⁷⁸ The next administration must do what it takes to defeat the Taliban, extend the central government's military and political reach and ensure that all regions and classes share in the economic benefits of democratization.
- *Double support for the National Endowment for Democracy.* This organization, which has effectively advanced the cause of democracy for nearly 25 years, promotes open and fair elections, a free press, robust civil society, equal rights for all citizens and other key norms and institutions. Its activities have energized indigenous democracy builders and inspired a number of our allies to create their own organizations along the same lines. Of special importance is increased support for the World Movement for Democracy, which brings together hundreds of pro-democratic organizations.
- *Use bilateral relations with autocratic regimes to press for democratic change.*⁷⁹

"In addition to reassuring other nations and thereby securing our own power and position, we need a system of effective global institutions to harness cooperation on problems we simply cannot tackle unilaterally or even bilaterally."

Anne-Marie Slaughter and John G. Ikenberry,
Princeton Project on National Security.

We should link economic aid and trade concessions more closely to political liberalization. And we should not allow autocratic leaders to effectively veto

American support for civil society groups in their nations. In the Middle East, we should use civil society funding to widen opportunities for moderate Islamists with no links to terrorist organizations to enter the political process. If we confine our aid to familiar secular elites, democratizing forces will continue to be politically marginal, and autocrats will continue to confront us with the choice between stability they allegedly promise and virulently anti-American, anti-democratic radicals who would take power if repression ceases.

- *Set a good example.* Fiascos such as the Florida controversy in 2000 call the integrity of our own democratic processes into question. And like it or not, the use of practices such as torture, extraordinary renditions, secret detention centers and legal gray zones such as Guantanamo have undermined our credibility as the leading advocate for global democratization.⁸⁰ Racial segregation played a similar role during the Cold War, and farsighted proponents saw equal rights for all not just as a domestic issue, but also as essential to strengthening our standing abroad. Today, under changed circumstances, the basic logic remains the same.

10. Building 21st Century Alliance Structures

As the initial military victory in Iraq turned into a grinding counterinsurgency campaign, we learned that our Cold War military—the troops, equipment and military doctrine—was ill-suited to meeting new challenges. Much the same is true of our key alliances and of international organizations. The United States need not choose between an obsolete multilateralism and counterproductive unilateralism, however. Instead, we must help shape an international system capable of meeting 21st century challenges and capturing the opportunities.

Accomplishing this task will require a near-total reversal of US policy. The Bush Administration's preference for unilateral action, ad hoc "coalitions of the willing," a la carte compliance with international law and contempt for the United Nations have set back global institutional developments and, even more to the point, have damaged confidence in the US as a global leader of the international system. The most important task facing the next President in building 21st century alliances and institutions is to restore the world's faith in American leadership and our investment in the international system we had a large role in creating. There are a number of concrete steps the US needs to take in order to restore faith:

- *Demonstrate American commitment to international law.* The Bush Administration has played fast and loose with some of America's most solemn international treaty obligations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These acts have contributed to the erosion of American authority and may well have undermined important international treaties that protect Americans, such as the Geneva Conventions.

A new president—or Congress in the interim, to the extent possible—should act immediately to reverse this trend by introducing legislation that codifies a definition of torture under US law that includes water boarding, extreme stress positions, sexual humiliation and other techniques used in recent years that are broadly considered to meet the definition of inhuman treatment. “Organ failure” should not be the American definition of torture. Furthermore, the State Department should be directed to set criteria and gather documentation that will be used for reparations to Iraqis and Afghans who suffered as the result of illegal acts committed by American forces or those acting on behalf of the United States (i.e., intelligence operatives and independent contractors).

The new president should issue an executive order forbidding the use of extraordinary renditions, and setting conditions on renditions to third countries (i.e., we will not deliver foreign nationals to third parties that will torture or kill them). The next president should also direct the Secretary of Defense to clarify rules of engagement for battlefield captures of stateless enemy combatants; current practice leaves too much up to troops in the field, which is unfair to our own forces as much as it is to our foes. S/He should also direct the Secretary to improve training, doctrine and rules of engagement for contact with civilian populations, which is going to be a regular feature of 21st century warfare—the abuses and treatment of civilians in Iraq has actually been counterproductive to our war aims there.⁸¹

The next president should close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, which has become a flashpoint for anti-American fervor, and cooperate with Congress to determine the best way to handle the prisoners held there, some of whom are far too dangerous to be released and should be brought to justice, and some of whom should have been released long ago. It is time for the United States to have a way of dealing with enemy combatants that is fully compatible with our treaty obligations under the Third Geneva Convention.

- *Reaffirm our support for the United Nations.* The UN is an imperfect institution with a huge, labyrinthine bureaucracy, but it is also the anchor of the international system. The world would be an even more dangerous and less decent place without the UN and its agencies.⁸² But the UN cannot thrive without American support and full participation, which has been lacking in the Bush years. The best way for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to the success of the UN would be to pay our UN dues and arrears in full and on time. Then we can turn, acting in good faith with the international community, to the important business of reforming the UN to meet 21st century needs.
- *Look past Iraq to old partnerships and alliances and new realities.* Iraq is now the all-consuming focus for the Administration and Congress, and that has drained far too much energy from other US concerns. The United States must tend to other relationships and realities. The Bush Administration’s contempt for some

of our European allies in the lead-up to the Iraq war damaged longstanding relationships and slowed progress in badly needed reforms of NATO. These relationships must be restored and NATO must be reshaped into an organization capable of meeting 21st century threats. In Latin America, a decline of US engagement has helped Hugo Chavez to gain momentum and stimulated an alarming rise in anti-US sentiment. Our inattention in Asia has allowed China to mount a charm offensive and form new regional arrangements that exclude the US, without much American response.

- *Seek out new international arrangements.* The six-party talks surrounding North Korea's nuclear program, for example, may be sowing the seeds for a new Northeast Asia cooperation organization. The US should seek to formalize this arrangement, as a way to sustain US influence in the region and to open channels for managing the shifting balance of power in Asia.
- *Reclaim a leadership role in negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.* The Bush Administration's decision to sit on the sidelines has been a disaster. The United States cannot impose a resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the two parties are unlikely to make progress without the assistance of the United States. Returning to an active commitment to the cause of Middle East peace will help repair the tremendous damage done to America's standing in the region in recent years.

V. Conclusion

Three decades ago, in the wake of our withdrawal from Vietnam, America turned inward.⁸³ The result was series of setbacks, some of which haunt us to this day. There is no doubt that most Americans feel badly burned by the conflict in Iraq. The danger is that we will retreat, not only from a war judged not worth the cost, but also from the world. This would be a disaster, and not for us alone.

The new strategy we advocate in this essay is designed to reduce the justified fears of the American people by focusing relentlessly on enhancing our security. But more than that, we have tried to clarify the terms of a new global engagement that the American people can support. In so doing, we hope to provide an alternative both to a failed status quo and to the understandable but unsustainable impulse to turn our back on it.

The war in Iraq has aroused passionate disagreement and exacerbated the already high levels of political polarization in our country. To some extent this is inevitable; wars that go badly do not leave public opinion tranquil and united. While it may not be realistic to expect that politics can still stop at the water's edge, surely we can agree that defending our country requires a steadiness of purpose incompatible with deep and poisonous divisions. In that spirit, we offer a strategy that rejects the sterile debate between realism and idealism and that draws on sensible ideas from both political parties.

There is a hitch, however. Good ideas are just the beginning of sound policy. Even if the current Administration were to change its mind on fundamentals, it would be incapable of leading the way, because at its core it does not take governance seriously. We do. Throughout this document, we pair our policy proposals with the essentials of effective governance: getting good people, adopting best practices and creating institutions that are flexible enough to meet new demands and new opportunities. The need for good governance is not restricted to the public sector. For any entity to run well—from a family-owned business to a Fortune 500 company—people, practices and institutions are the basic building blocks of success. Indeed, we have to treat the business of governance with all of the energy, seriousness of purpose and ambition for excellence that is so much a part of the American character.

On May 14, 1787, George Washington, serving as President of the Constitutional Convention, exhorted the delegates to set aside all considerations of immediate popularity and strive instead to promote the long-term welfare of the nation: "If to please the people we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair; the

event is in the hand of God." It is in that spirit, in times that once again try men's souls, that we offer our thoughts and hope they will be useful to men and women of good will, regardless of party.

Endnotes

¹ International Monetary Fund.

² According to Freedom House, the number of electoral democracies in the world grew from 69 in 1989 to 120 in 2001.

³ 82 percent of the public believe that the world is becoming more dangerous for the United States and its people; 48 percent say “much more dangerous.” Public Agenda, “Confidence in US Foreign Policy Index,” April 4 2007.

⁴ On this point, see “World View of US Role Goes from Bad to Worse,” www.worldpublicopinion.org.

⁵ See “World Publics Reject US Role as the World Leader,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, www.worldpublicopinion.org.

⁶ According to a recent survey, large majorities in key Muslim countries have highly negative views of our policy and believe that our real aim is to divide and weaken Islam. See “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda,” The Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, www.worldpublicopinion.org, April 24 2007.

⁷ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraq Civil War*, Washington DC, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper Number 11, January 2007.

⁸ For the sorry story of our abortive effort to promote democracy in Egypt, see Anthony Shadeded, “Imagining Otherwise in Egypt: Opposition Campaign Embodying Bush Vision Now Lies in Pieces,” *The Washington Post*, March 18 2007; and “Egypt Shuts Door on Dissent at US Officials Back Away,” *The Washington Post*, March 19 2007.

⁹ See Ahmed Rashid, “Musharraf at the Exit,” *The Washington Post*, March 22 2007.

¹⁰ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2007*.

¹¹ Robert S. Litwak, *Regime Change: US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007, p. 10. For an extended discussion of this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 320-337.

¹² Ron Suskind, “Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush,” *The New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 2004. To this day, despite authoritative government reports to the contrary, Vice President Cheney continues to insist that al-Qaeda was a significant presence in Iraq prior to the war. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Hussein’s Prewar Ties to Al-Qaeda Discounted,” *The Washington Post*, April 6 2007, A1.

¹³ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952, p. 143.

¹⁴ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007.

¹⁵ The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan represented a near-unique historical moment, not the template for a 21st century democratization agenda.

¹⁶ For the best recent discussions of the global commons and its associated public goods, see Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath* New York: Public Affairs, 2005, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

¹⁷ www.third-way.com/data/product/file/72/Third_Way_Terrorism_Report.pdf

¹⁸ Peter W. Singer and Hady Amr, “Engaging the Muslim World,” *Opportunity 08*, The Brookings Institution, April 2007.

¹⁹ For details, see Hady Amr and P.W. Singer, "Engaging the Muslim World: A Communications Strategy to Win the War of Ideas," Brookings, 2007, available at opportunity08@brookings.edu.

²⁰ For details, see Sharon Burke and Matt Bennett, "Beyond Bush: A New Strategy of Constriction to Defeat Al Qaeda and its Allies," Washington DC: Third Way, March 2007 (<http://third-way.com/products/72>).

²¹ Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 607 September 2006: 137.

²² Matthew Bunn, "A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 607 September 2006: 103-120.

²³ J. Peter Scoblic, "Moral Hazard," *The New Republic*, August 8 2005: 17.

²⁴ For systematic discussions along these lines, see Kurt Campbell and Michael O' Hanlon, *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* New York: Basic Books, 2006, chapter 8; and George Perkovich et al., *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2005.

²⁵ Sam Nunn, "The Race between Cooperation and Catastrophe," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 607 September 2006: 43-50.

²⁶ Campbell and O'Hanlon, pp. 214-215.

²⁷ Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, (New York: Times Books, 2004).

²⁸ Perkovich et al., pp. 97-99.

²⁹ Perkovich et al., pp. 42-44.

³⁰ While this may seem visionary, four experienced statesmen argue that halting proliferation may require us to go all the way to zero. See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4 2007.

³¹ Perkovich et al., pp. 56-57.

³² Michael McFaul, Abbas Milani, and Larry Diamond, "A Win-Win US Strategy for Dealing with Iran," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2006-07, p. 125.; and Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto, *Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran* Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, March 2007, pp. 27-29.

³³ For detail and analysis on these and other strategic issues, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military Strikes* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2006.

³⁴ Cirincione and Grotto, pp. 34-45.

³⁵ McFaul, Milani, and Diamond, op. cit., p. 126.

³⁶ Whatever strategy we choose, it is probably the case that the non-military "sticks" at our disposal, especially increasingly severe economic sanctions, will be more effective than carrots in convincing the Iranians that they must negotiate seriously. See Dennis Ross, "Squeeze Play," *The New Republic Online*, www.tnr.com, April 23 2007.

³⁷ Sen. Richard Lugar, "US Energy Security—A New Realism," speech delivered at the Brookings Institution, March 13 2006.

³⁸ David Sandalow, "Ending Oil Dependence," Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, January 22 2007, p. 1

³⁹ For good discussions of these and related energy illusions, see *National Security Consequences of US Oil Dependency: Report of an Independent Task Force* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, pp. 13-25.

⁴⁰ Sandalow, "Ending Oil dependence," p. 14.

⁴¹ Campbell and O'Hanlon, *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security*, New York: Basic Books, 2006, pp. 176-177.

⁴² Sandalow, "Ending Oil Dependence," p. 5.

⁴³ The Center for Naval Analysis, "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change," The CNA Corporation, 2007.

⁴⁴ PEW Center on Global Climate Change, *An Agenda for Climate Action*, February 2006.

⁴⁵ CAN Climate Change Report, p .31.

⁴⁶ Centre for European Policy Studies, "Reviewing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Part II: Priorities for Short-Term Implementation," March 2006 and European Commission Directorate General for the Environment, "Review of EU Emissions Trading Scheme—Survey Highlights," November 2005.

⁴⁷ See World Wildlife Federation's report "Vanishing Kingdom: The Melting Realm of the Polar Bear," at www.worldwildlife.org.

⁴⁸ Mann, M.E., and Emanuel, K.A., "Atlantic Hurricane Trends Linked to Climate Change," *Eos*, Vol. 87, No. 14, June 13, 2006.

⁴⁹ PEW Center on Global Climate Change, *An Agenda for Climate Action*, February 2006.

⁵⁰ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability," Working Group II Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report, 13 April 2007.

⁵¹ United Nations, "The Millennium Development Goals Report 2006," 2006.

⁵² Lael Brainard (ed.), *Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty and American Leadership*, Brookings Institution Press and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.

⁵³ Princeton Project on National Security, *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: US National Security in the 21st Century*, Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security, Anne-Marie Slaughter and John G. Ikenberry, Directors, September 2006.

⁵⁴ <http://www.truthandpolitics.org/military-relative-size.php>

⁵⁵ David S. Cloud, "Senate Democrats Call for Increase in Troops," *The New York Times*, July 14, 2005.

⁵⁶ Steven M. Kosiak, "Both DoD Base and War Budgets Receive Big Boosts, Total at Highest Level Since The End of World War II," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Update, February 5, 2007.

⁵⁷ Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, February 15, 2007.

⁵⁸ Personal communication to Elaine Kamarck, April 4, 2005.

⁵⁹ National Intelligence Council, "Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project," December 2004.

⁶⁰ For the latter scenario, see Stephen Flynn, *The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation* New York: Random House, 2007, pp. xi-xvii.

⁶¹ Flynn, *The Edge off Disaster*, chapter 6.

⁶² Flynn, *The Edge of Disaster*, pp. 97-100.

⁶³ Lael Brainard, "Organizing Foreign Assistance to Meet 21st Century Challenges," Security by Other Means, Brookings Institution Press and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.

⁶⁴ US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Addendum on Structure and Process Analyses, Volume V: The Department of State*.

⁶⁵ Brainard.

⁶⁶ Goldwater-Nichols is the 1986 legislation that successfully reshaped the Department of Defense. See Frank Carlucci and Ian Brzezinski, *State Department Reform: Report of an Independent Task Force*, Co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001.

⁶⁷ "In the Wake of War: Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities," Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 2005.

⁶⁸ This is a principal recommendation of the Special Inspector General's March 2007 report. See "Iraq Reconstruction," pp. 14-15.

⁶⁹ Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, "Statement Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities," June 29, 2006.

⁷⁰ Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O' Hanlon, *Hard Power: the New Politics of National Security*, Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2006.

⁷¹ Brainard, p. 11.

⁷² See, for example, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, 109th Congress, Second Session, December 15, 2006 and Richard Lugar, "Strengthen Civilian Forces, Too," *The Washington Times*, February 18, 2007.

⁷³ Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, "Public Diplomacy: How to Think about and Improve It," RAND Corporation Occasional Paper, 2004.

⁷⁴ "In the Wake of War: Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities," Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 2005.

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ See Recommendation 1, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 109th Congress, Second Session, December 15, 2006.

⁷⁷ *Id.*, Recommendation 4.

⁷⁸ Michael McFaul, "The Liberty Doctrine," *Policy Review* April 2002.

⁷⁹ Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul, "Seeding Liberal Democracy," in Will Marshall, ed., *With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, pp. 60-61.

⁸⁰ Daniel Benjamin, "A Smarter War on Terror," in Marshall, *With All Our Might*, p. 92.

⁸¹ See Thomas E. Ricks, "Gen. Petraeus Warns Against Using Torture," *The Washington Post*, May 11, 2007, p. A3.

⁸² Linda S. Jamison, "Leadership vs. Stewardship: Advice for the New UN Ambassador," CSIS Commentary, April 5, 2007.

⁸³ A 1976 survey by the Roper Organization found that 39 percent of respondents favored international engagement, and 38 percent favored isolationist policies. In subsequent annual polls, Roper charted a return to views favoring engagement; by 1986, 55 percent of respondents favored internationalism and 27 percent favored isolationism.



2000 L Street NW, Suite 702
Washington, DC 20036-4915

contact@third-way.com

202.775.3768
202.775.0430 fax

www.third-way.com