



THE THIRD WAY NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT


Our Military Stretched Thin: US Troops at the Breaking Point



July 2007

“People, Ideas, and Hardware. In that order!”

Col. John R. “Chuck” Boyd (USAF)



Ideas



Hardware



People

Today's US Military

	<u>Active Duty</u>	<u>Guard/Reserve</u>	<u>Total Force</u>
Army	505,400	536,300	1,041,700
Marine Corps	175,000	39,600	214,600
Navy	352,700	73,100	425,800
Air Force	351,800	180,800	532,600

Source: DoD FY08 Justification Books for Each Service, as reported by the DoD Comptroller

Strains on the Force

“What keeps me awake at night is what will this all-volunteer force look like in 2007?”

Gen. Richard Cody
Army Vice Chief of Staff (2005)



“The active Army is about broken.”

Gen. (Ret.) Colin Powell (2006)



“My bottom line is that the Army is unraveling, and if we don’t expend significant national energy to reverse that trend, sometime in the next two years we will break the Army just like we did during Vietnam. Only this time we won’t have 10 years to fix it again.”

Gen. (Ret.) Barry McCaffrey (2007)



Strains on the Force

People

- ✓ **Not Enough People: Army is Too Small; Recruitment Troubles**
- ✓ **Leadership Crisis: Retention of Officers**
- ✓ **Unsustainable Tempo: Not Enough Rest and Training**

Equipment

- ✓ **Insufficient Equipment in the Field**
- ✓ **Almost No Equipment for Training or Emergencies**


Support

- ✓ **Medical/Mental Health Care Deficiencies**
- ✓ **Stress Impacts War-Fighting Capacity**

People • Equipment • Support

Not Enough People: Army End-Strength

Number of Active Duty Army Personnel Since WWII



People • Equipment • Support

Not Enough People: Recruitment Problems

- 2005: Army missed recruiting goal by 6,627
- 2006: Army met goal (80,000 recruits), but changed:
 - **Bonuses:** Tripled
 - **Age:** Raised
 - **Moral Waivers:** Tripled (robbery, aggravated assault, etc.)
 - In 2007, 12% of recruits have criminal records
 - **Medical Waivers:** Expanded
 - **Training Standards:** Cut (less specialty training, fewer washouts)
- ROTC and West Point falling short of officer goals



People • Equipment • Support

Leadership Crisis: Retention of Officers

Active Duty Officer Shortfall: 3,000

Junior Officers:

Recent West Point Grads leaving the service

- Departing at highest rate in 30 years
- 2006 departure rate: 46% (Class of 2001)
- Average departure rate in 1990s: 29%

Mid-Level Officers:

Army is short 17% of the Majors it needs

- Accelerated promotions, lower standards
- 98% of eligible 1st Lts make Capt. (vs. 90%)
- Promotions in 38 months (vs. 42)
- 97% of Captains make Major (10 yrs vs. 11)



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Leadership Crisis: Retention of Officers

Experienced junior officers are indispensable in counterinsurgency warfare:

“Junior [Army] officers know that success in these wars is about a lot more than killing the enemy. It depends on providing security for the people, finding friends and fixing infrastructure. A lot of senior officers just don’t get it.”



Major John Prior (USA)
(Former company commander in Baghdad)

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Leadership Crisis: Retention of NCOs

Sergeants also leaving the force in record numbers

- 400% increase in mid-grade Sergeants leaving
 - Departure rate: 2005 4% ➡ 2007 16%




“The sergeant is the one that the soldiers take after... He can make or break how effective the privates are.”

First Sgt. James Adcock (USA)
(3rd Armored Cavalry)



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Unsustainable Tempo: Not Enough Rest and Training



CBO Projection:

1:3



Army Baseline:

1:2



Current:

Army: 5:4
15 month-12 month



Marines: 7:6
7 month-6 month



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Unsustainable Tempo: Not Enough Training

“Army units don’t fail to train on tasks like language, culture, and intelligence because we’re stupid or lazy; we fail because we don’t have the time to do it right.”



Lt. Col. Paul Yingling
Deputy Commander, Third Armored
Cavalry Regiment



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Unsustainable Tempo: Guard and Reserve

Magnitude of the Problem

- 2007: 81,633 Guard/Reserve troops on active duty
- 2001-07: More than 580,000 Guard/Reserves called up
- Some units have had 2-3 tours of 12-18 months

Impact of the Problem

- More than 300 Delta Airline pilots on active duty; airline spends \$12.5 million per year for 90 extra pilots
- 54% of employers surveyed said they would not knowingly hire members of the Guard or Reserve (even though that's illegal)
- 44% of law enforcement agencies surveyed report losing personnel to Guard/Reserve call-ups



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Insufficient Equipment in the Field

Active Duty Troops Struggling to Get the Weapons and Gear They Need to Fight

“Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan have experienced shortages of force-protection equipment like up-armored vehicles, electronic countermeasure devices, crew-served weapons, and communications equipment.



“As a result, Service members were not always equipped to effectively complete their missions...They used informal procedures to obtain equipment and sustainment support, and canceled or postponed missions while waiting to receive equipment.”

DoD Office of Inspector General (1/25/07)



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Almost No Equipment for Active Non-Deployed

Non-Deployed units can't train effectively

- Missing rifles, machine guns, and communications systems
- No Humvees, so soldiers train on old trucks instead



“In a couple of months, my guys are going to be busting down doors, and it will be the first time they see some of their equipment for real.”

First Sgt. Bradley Feltman
(3rd Infantry Division)

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Almost No Equipment for Active Non-Deployed

Army unable to respond to an urgent crisis elsewhere in the world

- “Ready brigade” no longer on-call for immediate deployment
- Pre-positioned weapons and hardware stocks depleted
- No Army brigade has enough equipment to be sent quickly into combat, except for unit defending South Korea

“To meet our immediate wartime needs, we pooled equipment from across the force to equip soldiers deploying in harm’s way... This increases the risk for our next-to-deploy units, and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies.”

Gen. (Ret.) Peter Schoomaker
Fmr. Chief of Staff, USA (Feb. 2007)



People • Equipment • Support

Almost No Equipment for Guard and Reserve

“88% of the forces that are in the United States are very poorly equipped today in the Army National Guard... The average Army National Guard unit has about 40% of the equipment it’s supposed to have to do its mission... To bring the Army and Air Guard up to an acceptable level of readiness—80% of the equipment authorized on hand—would cost \$40 billion.”

Lt. Gen. Steven Blum
 Chief of National Guard Bureau
 (1/31/07 & 3/27/07)



**Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages
 Among Nondeployed Army National Guard Units**

	Number of items authorized	Number of items on hand	Percentage of authorized in inventory
Equipment for handling truck containers	25	4	16
Machine guns	1,088	150	14
Chemical decontamination equipment	514	73	14
Armament carrier humvees	2,240	220	10
Truck flatbed semitrailers	2,287	180	8
Lightweight rifles	16,839	788	5
Individual night vision goggles	127,000	1,000	1
Weapon night vision sights	11,400	0	0
Up-armored scout humvees	3,922	0	0
Chemical agent monitoring equipment	7,200	0	0

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2006.

**Nondeployed Guard Units:
 0-16% of Equipment They Need**

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Overusing Our Soldiers and Marines

Perstempo pace exceeds WWII

- In World War II, deployed soldiers in high-level combat units were given one month of rest after every three months on the line.
- In Iraq, soldiers spend up to 15 months in continuous combat, and are deployed multiple times




“At no time in our military history have soldiers or Marines been required to serve on the front line for a period of six-seven months, let alone a year, without a significant break in order to recover from the physical, psychological, and emotional demands of war.”

Col. Carl Castro
US Army Mental Health Expert

People • Equipment • Support

Medical/Mental Health Care Deficiencies

- 30% of soldiers and Marines in Iraq combat units suffer from anxiety, depression, or acute stress.
- In Army, drug use and suicide rates in Iraq and Kuwait have nearly doubled.
- Stateside, binge drinking is up 30% .
- PTSD 50% more likely for those serving more than one tour.
- Veterans: 73,000 Iraq and Afghanistan Army vets have mental illness, while VA admits waiting lists render mental health care “virtually inaccessible.”



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Mental Health: Key to an Effective Fighting Force

“Counterinsurgency forces achieve the most meaningful success by gaining popular support and legitimacy... not by killing insurgents.”

Gen. David Petraeus
Commanding General, MNF-Iraq (2006)



Soldiers in Iraq with high levels of combat stress are often unsuited for counterinsurgency missions:

- 7x more likely to hit an Iraqi civilian
- 2x more likely to violate military's ethical standards



When asked, 53% of soldiers and 62% of Marines in Iraq don't agree that civilians should be treated with dignity and respect.

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Medical/Mental Health Care Deficiencies

“The Army is deliberately shortchanging troops on their disability retirement ratings to hold down costs, veterans’ advocates, lawyers, and service members say...”

ArmyTimes

“From 2000 to 2006, 13,000 soldiers were found unfit for duty, yet given disability ratings of 0%... For these Army soldiers rated at 0% by DoD, the average VA rating was 56%.”

Lieutenant Gen. (Ret.) James Terry Scott
Chmn. Vet. Disability Benefits Commission
(Senate Armed Services Comm. testimony, 4/12/07)



People • Equipment • Support

Medical/Mental Health Care Deficiencies

“The medical disability system is unfair and broken . . . [Soldiers] are caught in a dehumanizing bureaucracy that devalues their sacrifices as it crunches numbers to minimize their benefits...The disability system cheats those who sacrifice the most in service to their nation. The problem is deep-rooted and institutional, and can’t be plastered over.”



Army Times Editorial (3/19/07)

ArmyTimes

Strains on the Military

Repairing the Damage

- **Stop Digging:** Drawdown American troops from Iraq and focus on an effective offensive strategy against al Qaeda and its allies.
- **Take the Problem Head-On:** Reset the military, with a focus on the troops – provide the right people, equipment and support.
- **Put Everything on the Table:** Consider everything, from cutting Cold War weapons systems to new defense funding.



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